The road from Al-Mansour Street where the U.S. embassy is headquartered in Damascus to Al-Rashid Street home of the Syrian Presidential Palace, has only been taken by handful of American diplomats in the last few decades. Edward Djerejian strode up that path many times as US ambassador to Syria (1989-1991), and later on in official and unofficial capacities. Today from his office at the James Baker institute for public diplomacy in Texas, he expresses deep concern of a “prolonged confrontation” between the regime and the opposition in Syria as the uprising enters its seventh month. Djerejian reflects on his meetings with the only two presidents that Syrians knew since 1971. He sees in the late President Hafez Al-Assad several leadership traits that are lacking with his son the current President Bashar Al-Assad, and considers the status-quo as “unsustainable” for the regime. Following is the text of the interview: -Has the situation in Syria reached a point of no return for the regime? Unless there is a catalytic event that changes the situation on the ground between the regime and the opposition forces in Syria, I fear that there will be a prolonged and tragic confrontation in the near term with no victors or vanquished. The Syrian regime has made it clear that it will implement reforms only on its own terms and on its own timetable and that it will use lethal force against its own people who, in popular uprisings and demonstrations, are demanding structural political, social and economic change akin to the Arab Awakening in the region. (Syrian President) Bashar al-Assad's position from the very beginning of his tenure has been to talk about reforms, but to delay implementation of comprehensive reforms indefinitely. I remember a discussion I had with him in 2003 in Damascus, which I wrote about in my book “Danger and Opportunity—An American Ambassador's Journey through the Middle East.” While reiterating the importance he attached to reforms, al-Assad indicated that he was in no rush to implement them. In one discussion he told me that the people have to be ready for reforms and that the first step was “administrative reforms.” This was a clear stepping back from what appeared to be the promise of a young reformist president in 2000 when he came to power. This stance even in the face of the mass uprisings in Syria continues to characterize the regime's stubborn approach to a meaningful reform agenda. - Given how disorganized and divided the opposition is, and that there hasn't been any major defections within the establishment, what is the way out? Do you fear a sectarian war? The lack of unity and coherent political direction amongst the Syrian opposition groups play into the regime's hands as it continues to cling to power. The Alawite dominated security forces and military, as well as the adherence, to date, of the vested interest groups around the regime provide it with a lifeline. But I do not believe this is sustainable in the long term. There are historic, regional forces at play here and the Arab Awakening represents a tectonic shift in the political landscape of the Middle East. With the continuing bloody confrontations between Syrian protesters and the regime's security apparatus, the deteriorating economic situation in Syria-- that is increasingly exacerbated by stronger international sanctions-- and with Syria's growing isolation, the very legitimacy of the Syrian regime is in question and has, in effect, been lost in the eyes of many countries. A turning point in the situation will be if and when the Syrian street in Aleppo and Damascus becomes the focal point of mass protests akin to what has occurred in Dera'a, Homs, Hama, Latakia, Deir Ez-Zor and elsewhere. At that point Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's recent warnings in Cairo of the danger of sectarian war in Syria could very well become a reality. That scenario would pose a clear and present danger to the Syrian people, in the first instance, and to the region as a whole. -How do you assess the Obama administration positions, calling on Assad to step down, imposing sanctions, working with opposition? It is rather remarkable, in my opinion, that both the regional states and the international community at the outset of the protests in Syria gave Bashar al-Assad leeway to get in front of the protest movement and institute meaningful reforms and that he did not take advantage of the situation. He talked the talk, but didn't walk the walk. Even today, Russia is urging him to engage with the opposition to initiate these reforms. The Obama Administration gave Assad the benefit of the doubt earlier, but became rightfully disenchanted, along with many other governments, with the brutal crackdown on his people and the resistance to enacting real reforms. Further, it is in the interests of the United States to be on the right side of history in the Arab Awakening and to support the legitimate demands of the Arab people for freedom, individual self determination, political participation, and social and economic justice. - Can sanctions bring Assad down, or can he replicate the Saddam model? International sanctions are effective to the extent that they are comprehensive and multilateral. Unilateral sanctions while they can be damaging to the targeted country are largely political statements. As more countries join in to impose sanctions on the Syrian regime, the pressure on Assad's regime will grow and will have an effect. But it will be important to get key member states in the UNSC such as Russia and China on board. - Is the military option realistic today? If not, what would be the game changer? I do not think a military option is realistic in the Syrian context. Certainly, it would be ill-advised for the United States, in my view, to get engaged in another military operation in the broader Middle East in light of our military commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and with NATO in Libya. This is not a situation that can be managed directly by outside forces. The dynamics of change in Syria will come from within. The international community can lend its support to these forces of change but not lead them. The game changer would be a catalytic event that is unforeseen or the rise of the street in Aleppo and Damascus. - You've personally dealt with both Assads—the father and the son—what are the striking similarities/ differences? The basic similarity I see in both Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad is that the son has by and large continued the domestic and foreign policy lines that his father had established. The major difference I see is in the realm of leadership traits. Namely, Hafez al-Assad was in total control of his government, power structure and country. He was very deliberative in his decision making process, but once he made a decision it was definitive. You could take it to the bank. That, ironically, is what then-Israeli Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin told me just before I left for Damascus as the United States Ambassador in 1988. Rabin said that was Israel's experience with Hafez al-Assad. I, actually, related Rabin's view to Hafez al-Assad in my last meeting with him as ambassador in 1991 and Assad quipped that I could tell Rabin he was right. I do not see this same control and decisiveness in Bashar al-Assad. There is an ambiguity in his leadership style that leaves many questions unanswered and raises doubts about his appreciation of red lines on sensitive policy issues. - How would a Syria without Assad shape the region? What would it mean for Hizballah, and for regional stability? There is no doubt in my mind that if there is regime change in Syria, the two immediate major losers would be Iran and Hizballah. Syria represents Iran's outreach to the Arab world in the Levant and its facilitative agent with Hizballah and the confrontation with Israel. The relative decline of Iran's influence in that region and the loss by Hizballah of Syria as a political ally and transit point for Iranian support would change the regional dynamic in an important manner. Nevertheless, in the absence of real and meaningful progress in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations to resolve, in the first instance, the Palestinian issue, and the Syrian and Lebanese fronts, the region will remain unstable and dangerous.
