Perhaps the first result of the new constitution, following the referendum and the approval of the constitutional council, is that Morocco will have new legislative and executive institutions that will embody the constitution's advanced notions of the separation of powers and distribution of jurisdictions, or in other words, for it to be implemented on the ground; this in fact shall constitute a test for intentions and wills. Practically, it is hard to achieve this transition without enacting laws on the elections process, the division of [electoral] districts, and achieving consensus over the voting process. This is in addition to re-evaluating the parties' law, the limits of the alliances and the methods of dealing with the values and concepts engendered by the new constitution. Thus, there is still an overlap between the ousted institutions and the institutions that are required to be formed: For instance, the current parliament might call for an emergency meeting in order to pass the draft laws in question. This means that it is the current government that would be preparing this batch of laws, in a framework of consensus that would deny the government its parliamentary majority that would otherwise allow it to impose its point of view. This entails a wider participation of the opposition as long as things involve crucial issues. In truth, the path that Morocco took by organizing early elections under a new constitutional authority has prevented the country from falling into the trap of political vacuum. Whether the government of the current Prime Minister, Abbas al-Fasi will be performing these practical steps through the power of the legislative institution that will be ousted soon; or whether there will be a government of national unity led by an independent figure in order to prevent any partisan misinterpretation of the content of these procedures, the sure thing is that the country has stepped into a new phase where there is no room for going back to the old ways. The important thing is that the constitutional text has ended the practices that used to be bound to partisan formalities on the executive level, and which often do not rise to the level of political governance, in light of the domination of [apolitical] technocrats. In addition, on the legislative level, these practices used to be subject to fragile alliances, based, in their negative aspects, on something known as the phenomenon of “defection,” i.e. switching partisan affiliation at any time. And more importantly, the constitutional authority is no more confined, in the loose sense, to expressing [popular] will through voting, as it has rather linked it to the notions of sovereignty, freedom, and transparency. This development in itself reflects the new standards of arbitration in the event of any conflicts. There is no higher law than the constitution in settling such conflicts. Outside the legal description of the preamble and clauses of the first constitution in the reign of King Mohammed VI, there is the political dimension, which consists of reconsidering the role of the political parties. The constitution of 1966, which had allowed for confidence building between the royal court and the opposition, culminated with the formation of a rotational government that brought the opposition parties to the government. Similarly, the main characteristic of the 2011 constitution is that it has well defined the features of the political scene. The political parties in the opposition and the loyalists are now aware that no pressure, except for the outcomes of the voting ballots, can otherwise create new political realities; and no constraints, except for the commitment to the constitution, can prevent the executive branch from dealing with various issues. Meanwhile, the arbitration role of the royal institution has now become clearer. Truth be told, the authority tasked with the powers of arbitration has extensions and foundations in experiences that would have been impossible to settle if it wasn't for the authority enjoyed by the “Emir of the believers” [i.e. the monarchy], and its protection of unity and pluralism. Nothing is more indicative of that than the Moroccan society as it was under the threat of being divided between those persons calling for women's rights through a more secular structure, and the conservatives who wanted nothing but religious laws. Then, the royal arbitration offered a middle ground. In the issue of adopting the Amazigh language as an official language in addition to Arabic, as well, it seemed that the country was facing the threat of conflicting and contradictory trends. Thus, the arbitration institutions settled this. This means that submitting to the rules of the political disputes calls for the need of a referee. True, respecting the desire of the voters remains one of the most prominent standards of the democratic directions of the 1966 constitution, which rescued the country from sudden death. However, the new constitution is betting on a smooth change that would draft the road map amid the regional tornados.
