The Israeli deputy who wished for the physical liquidation of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad during his presence in Lebanon must be beyond insane. The deputy, a medicine professor and an expert in eradication, only proved that the plague of fascism has spread throughout Israel, which no longer has any means to get rid of its enemies other than liquidation. Despite the call that was made by the deputy, the division among the Lebanese over Ahmadinejad's visit was not overcome. Indeed, as some were praising his “heroism,” others were expressing pessimism because his arrival could enhance the stringency affecting the positions of the former opposition team, at a time when this team is engaged in a battle to topple the international tribunal and eliminate the indictment before its issuance. In any case, the Americans will require a greater effort – which could be in vain – to promote their concerns over the “undermining of Lebanon's stability” against the backdrop of the visit, while the Israeli official position – coincidently – featured a warning to the Lebanese. What is certain is that Ahmadinejad did not come to set the foundations for a new phase of relations between Beirut and Tehran. He rather came to mark the culmination of the two-track policy, one with the state that wishes to see cooperation to serve its interests and one with the old ally, Hezbollah. The latter keeps reminding the Lebanese that the aid and funds of the Islamic Republic in Iran are the only ones which allowed the Southerners to stand fast throughout the years of confrontation against the Israeli attacks, and allowed the resistance to prevent Israel from scoring a victory during the July 2006 war. Yet, during his visit, Ahmadinejad is trying to bridge the gap between the two tracks and seeking to give an additional dosage to the relations with the state, a step which must go through institutions and ministries to sign memorandums of understanding and ensure cooperation. Some at this level compared between the Iranian president's rhetoric about the support of the Lebanese government and the talk about the institutionalization of Syrian-Lebanese relations, recalling that Ahmadinejad recently stated that the international tribunal was a Lebanese affair. But does this annul the fact that Tehran's most prominent ally is the one leading the battle to topple the tribunal which it perceives as being politicized? Moreover, is the calm of the Iranian guest – as opposed to the Israeli campaign against the “repercussions” of the visit – enough to convince the March 14 team that what Ahmadinejad primarily wants is to support the Lebanese state and not the allies alone in their battle on the domestic arena, especially since they are accused of seeking to control the state? What topples the American “concern” pretext toward Ahmadinejad's visit is the fact that the new Lebanese-Iranian agreements will not include the military facet, and the fact that the Iranian president made sure to issue an appeal from Beirut calling for the unity of the Lebanese people. This went in line with the official nature of his visit, especially since he holds Israel responsible for the attempts to generate strife in the country. As for his insistence on contacting the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz, and Jordanian Monarch King Abdullah II a few hours before his arrival to Beirut, it is believed to be an attempt to reassure them vis-à-vis Tehran's similar wish to see calm in Lebanon after Damascus confirmed it was holding on to the Saudi-Syrian safety net. The promoters of the theory regarding the steadfastness of the tripartite alliance between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah, say that the Syrian official position which insisted on the results of the Lebanese-Saudi-Syrian summit in Baabda did not prevent the party from launching its campaign against the international tribunal or from raising the issue of the false witnesses while its allies were threatening to topple the government. In the meantime, some skeptics perceived Ahmadinejad's visit as an attempt to deter the so-called reassignment of Damascus to solely manage the Lebanese file, a theory whose veracity they proved by referring to Hezbollah's popular reception of the Iranian president and its placement of Tehran's role in first place, before and after the July 2006 war. Regardless of the reality of the situation, the hope expressed by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal to see “great momentum” affecting the outcome of Ahmadinejad's visit at the level “of Lebanese peace,” opened the door before speculations tackling the possible extension of what was referred to as being the “truce” accompanying this visit - in the battle of the “false witnesses” and the international tribunal – and the intensification of the Iraqi-Arab contacts to end the government formation crisis in Iraq. Consequently, truce in Lebanon seems to be an Iranian need whenever Tehran is preparing for a new round of negotiations with the West. … However, is it a need for Tehran's allies who are engaged in a decisive battle? All the Lebanese should welcome the Iranian guest, let alone if his visit is one of truce. Still, this visit will be followed by the resumption of a major collision, after which no one knows what safety umbrella will remain standing, especially if the circle of non-Lebanese silent conflicts were to expand.
