The settlement that was reached by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Syria over the international tribunal that was formed to look into the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri is not only preoccupying the Lebanese political circles, but also all the concerned regional and international sides. What has raised and is still raising the tension is this secrecy that surrounds the details, and that prompted Washington to deny a few days ago any knowledge of a settlement and corroborate its insistence on the tribunal. This denial firstly conveys an attempt to learn the details, and secondly aims at warning against any measures which might lead to the relinquishing of the tribunal. It also conveys a rejection of any settlement that could divest the American administration and its partners from a card that could be used as a pressure tool in the face of Iran and its allies in the region. It is normal for the American administration to express its discontent toward the anticipated settlement. Indeed, it never felt comfortable about France's openness toward Syria, but also about that of Saudi Arabia and then Saad al-Hariri, who exonerated Syria from his father's assassination. Earlier, it had expressed its discontent toward Walid Jumblatt's complete reversal from one position to another. This administration did not break away from the course of the previous one that was exerting pressures on Syria, firstly through its support of the international investigation into Al-Hariri's case and the other assassinations, and secondly through its support of the formation of the international tribunal, considering that the administration of Bush Jr. perceived Damascus as being “Iran's tool” due to its support of Hezbollah. Washington's recent positions stem from the fact that it was completely distanced from what is happening between Riyadh and Damascus, but also from its conviction that the upcoming settlement will end the effects of the tribunal, even if it were to proceed with its work. The settlement will not stop at the level of the rejection of the indictment, considering that the upcoming measures of Al-Hariri's government will lead to the relinquishing of the tribunal by Lebanon. This will render Lebanon like Sudan, which ignored and is still ignoring all the measures and arrest warrants issued by Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Luis Moreno Ocampo against President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, on charges of “involvement in war crimes, crimes against humanity and massacres committed in Darfur.” In the meantime, the Sudanese president is having no trouble moving in the Arab, African and Islamic space. Washington is aware of the fact that the settlement will reshuffle the cards and change the positions on the Lebanese domestic arena, and that it will establish a new balance of powers that will grant Syria the upper hand in the management of the country. This simply means that a change will affect the balance of powers in the region, or at least the conditions of the political game, at the expense of the American strategy. In this context, it would be enough to recall that former American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice believed that the elimination of Hezbollah will allow the birth of a democratic government in the context of the “New Middle East.” This belief prevailed prior to the July 2006 war, and following the obstructed instatement of democracy in Iraq that was destined to constitute the cornerstone in building this Middle East, and could have carried the “infection” to its neighbors Syria and Iran, i.e. the United States' archenemies. This was recalled a few days ago by former envoy of the Bush administration to the United Nations John Bolton, who wrote that the indictment of the STL will accuse Hezbollah and Syrian officials and renew the July 2006 war. This talk enhances Hezbollah's theory regarding the fact that the tribunal is politicized and is a “tool” in the hands of the United States and Israel, but also its concerns in regard to seeing the indictment constitute a signal for the resumption of an Israeli war that failed to achieved its desired results in 2006. In reality, whether the tribunal is politicized or not, it has become part of the greater political game in the region and everything that affects it will affect the balance prevailing over the regional confrontation between all the conflicting sides. Therefore, Syria's warnings against the negative repercussions of the indictment on Lebanon surfaced early on, knowing that these repercussions will affect it next although it did not mention this issue. It is also in this context that we saw the emergence of the position of Supreme Guide Sayyed Ali Khamenei in the form of a “fatwa,” in which he described the tribunal as being “fabricated and only in form,” assuring it was “rejected” and that any decision it issues is “null” and without value. It is as though he were defining the ceiling of the Saudi-Syrian settlement which was rejected by Washington on the other hand. There is no doubt that the contradictory positions of Washington and Tehran are casting their heavy shadows over the understanding, and are placing restrictions that will render the ripening of the bilateral understanding between Riyadh and Damascus quite difficult. Iran does not want a temporary solution to be reached by the understanding and wants to see the tribunal buried once and for all. As for the United States, it wants the understanding to be part of a process which includes all the other elements that compose the confrontation with Iran and its allies – the most prominent of which being Hezbollah. The question at this level is the following: Did these two positions lead to the delay affecting the settlement? Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri announced his approval, but stated that the other side was “not respecting the steps it pledged to undertake.” Of course a settlement means there is a compromise or a trade-off, but until now, the “price” offered to Al-Hariri, who will face discontent in the ranks of his sect and anger in the ranks of his allies – which might lead to the end of the March 14 movement – is not yet known. Is it just the reactivation of the governmental work, the closing of the false witnesses file and the other financial files related to the Ministry of Finance and public debt and the closing of the file of the Syrian warrants issued against a number of his close aides? Or will there be other items which Hezbollah will have difficulty abiding by? Of course, the arms issue is the one over which Washington wants to reach a compromise, knowing that this is impossible, because the party is not ready to tackle it and Lebanon is not ready to face it. Moreover, there is the party's relation with two major states, i.e. Syria and Iran, which are completely rejecting any attempt to touch these arms, unless there is a miracle and all the sides in the region were to sit around the table of negotiations to resolve this complex network of issues, from Afghanistan to Lebanon going through Iraq and Palestine. In the meantime, the administration's insistence on the tribunal does not mean it favors war as it was heralded by Bolton, considering that President Barack Obama is not about to stop his diplomatic efforts, whether at the level of the Palestinian cause, the nuclear file or the renewal of the relations with Damascus despite Congress' opposition. Moreover, he is not about to stop the efforts to rebuild trust in the United States and its credibility in the region. What interests the administration is to halt the settlement because it is convinced that Iran – which is concerned about Hezbollah's fate – is not ready to engage with it in serious talks. Indeed, if the Islamic Republic is delighted about the retreat of the American projects in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, why would it give Washington an opportunity and offer it “rewards” in Lebanon where its ally has proved to be capable of changing the entire situation and of controlling it even if by force as it happened in May 2008. Consequently, neither Syria is willing to relinquish the party which is strengthening its regional role, nor is the Islamic Republic allowing anything to affect the weapons of the resistance which constitute a main tool in the strategy to defend its interests and role in the “Great Middle East,” and especially its nuclear file which Israel is threatening to annihilate. Even the United States itself is not ready to sit around the table since - alongside Israel - it believes that the Iranian nuclear program is facing numerous troubles and that the production of a nuclear bomb will require three years as it was stated by Moshe Ya'alon, the Israeli minister of strategic affairs. It also considers that the sanctions are achieving their goals seen in the repeated security events in official and non-official sensitive locations, the threats received by the Iranian scientists, the millions of cyber attacks against the centrifuge facility, the Stuxnet virus which targeted the Bushehr reactor, and the social implications that will be result from the decision to remove the subsidies on gasoline, diesel and some food products. Sooner or later, these problems will weaken the regime from within, and consequently its ability to provide its allies abroad with the required financial and military aid. Only then will the conditions of the settlement ripen. Therefore, there is no way for the United States to achieve its goal in Lebanon, while although the Saudi-Syrian understanding distanced it from the details of the settlement, what is mostly disconcerting to it is seeing the surfacing of an understanding that is not under its auspices, so as not to say far from its wishes. The same goes for Iran which is supporting the settlement and is knowledgeable about its details through Damascus and Hezbollah, but would have probably preferred to be a partner with Saudi Arabia as its new foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, expressed the wish to build exceptional relations with the Kingdom and with Turkey. However, Riyadh certainly wants to enhance Damascus' role solely, a thing that is rendering the latter more influential at the level of Hezbollah which will owe it for its role in toppling the tribunal. Moreover, enhancing bilateral relations will facilitate coordination and agreements over other regional files which constitute a common object of concern. Back when it was engaged in dialogue with Syria, the United States knew what was happening in Lebanon and especially on the southern front. Therefore, its appointment of a new ambassador in this country a few days ago means it is willing to renew this dialogue. This will lead to the enhancement of Damascus' role in the region whenever there is an American need to deliver messages or demands to the resistance. As for the appointment itself, it falls in line with the foreign policy of Obama's administration which is aware of the fact that the best way to maintain stability in light of the obstruction of the settlement and the troubles in Iraq, would be by establishing some sort of dialogue with Syria. Indeed, such dialogue would alleviate the tensions on certain fronts, impose some sort of red lines which all the sides will have to respect, and prevent the eruption of a major conflict in the event of an unanticipated event. In this manner, the administration will not only be talking to Israel and will be able to include Syria while maintaining the confrontation with Iran and the pressures on Hezbollah through the tribunal. This is also why Washington is always stressing the necessity not to obstruct the tribunal, so that it remains a pressure tool that is also used when dealing with both Damascus and Tehran.
