The peace process in the Middle East is not an American-Israeli one. Basically, and both in terms of essence and goals, it is an Arab-Israeli process. Washington's stance in this respect takes on particular importance in light of the US capacity to press Tel Aviv into peace with the Arabs. The Obama administration is mustering this capacity now, as it underlines the convergence between its approach to the Arab-Israeli peace and the Arab peace initiative. Interestingly, it is this emphasis, buttressed by collective international stances, that is likely to push the peace process forward, if any. Much has been said about the new American approach to the region and its determination to heed its new position vis-à-vis the peace process. Much has also been said about the Israeli government's rejection of both this stance and approach, to the extent that the US-Israeli disagreement has flagrantly surfaced for the first time after Netanyahu's talks with Obama and other officials in Washington. The question arises over the ability of Netanyahu – alongside the American lobby – to hamper and sidetrack the new US approach, and the ability of the US administration to dictate its vision for a solution on Netanyahu and his government. However, this process is not only confined to the American and Israeli sides, but also includes the present-absent Arab side in the US-Israeli talks. If the Arab diplomacy manages to reinforce the American ability to negotiate with Israel, the American pressure will be fruitful. But if the Arab diplomacy views what happens between Washington and Tel Aviv as a bilateral issue and if it is waiting for the outcome of their talks to espouse a position, then this diplomacy will weaken the US ability to apply pressures on Israel, thus undermining the peace prospects. Driven by its ideology and structure, the current Israeli government is harmed by peace. As such, any real progress towards peace means putting nails in its coffin. Therefore, in order to undermine this chance, it attempts to change the peace priorities, whether in terms of its requirements or by giving more attention to the Iranian file. It lives off the state of non-peace and benefits from beating the war drums, if not provoking war as a means to reshuffle the equation and dictate its priorities. In return, there are those amongst the Arabs who benefit from the present stalemate, linking it to the ongoing tension, the stalled peace process, and likely-to-be-aborted new opportunity. Here lies the great challenge to the Arab diplomacy, whether in terms of clinging to the foundations of just and comprehensive peace, or containing the effects of those harmed from peace, which was adopted as a strategic choice to settle the dispute with Israel. Any Arab justification for slackness – under the pretext of Israel's intransigence – would practically leave the diplomatic arena open to extremists from both sides. This is the shortest way to weaken the American position vis-à-vis Israel and to burry the newborn chance – only if we assume that Arabs, with their various directions, still embrace peace as an option that it is in their interest to heed on the basis of the Arab initiative. In this sense, the current period represents a serious test for the Arab intentions on the peace issue. Appropriate circumstances must be created to stop Arabs themselves from gambling on the ongoing turmoil and tension to reap benefits and neutralize the clout of those who believe that the peace process is harmful to their political and ideological interests.
