There was not one sign in Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's interview with Al-Hayat yesterday pointing to his defense of the interests of one particular sect in the face of other competing sects. The man rather presented himself as a national and legitimate representative, rising above the sects toward an open horizon before a participation in the authority that would be fair to all the Iraqi components. Al-Maliki's main concern is to avoid seeing Iraq return to a near past that was filled with civilian-sectarian infighting, and one which is a bit farther away and was characterized by the tyranny exercised by one side over the other. His goal is to build a state which has “unfortunately” not gotten rid yet of the quotas of the sects and the people, but is free from corruption and capable of managing its own affairs with the minimum level of foreign interference. The political stalemate which has been prevailing over the country for the last six months and which allowed the resumption of the brutal killings is, in Al-Maliki's opinion, a side-effect that will dissipate after concord is reached among the major parliamentary blocs. The statements of the Iraqi prime minister might reassure readers who only perceive the direct meanings of words. However, a second reading into Al-Maliki's interview reveals that the situation is more complicated than it appears. Indeed, the new government's refusal to be born is not just about diverging opinions over the division of the prerogatives as it could be understood from the context of the interview. It rather points to a deep flaw affecting the mechanism of the rotation of power in Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein stage. The government that should be formed will remain – regardless of the names of its members – too weak to handle a “wall of mistrust, concerns and differing viewpoints.” This wall rises high among the Iraqi sects and was not built by Saddam Hussein alone, as he was preceded in placing the foundations of the wall of sectarian fears by centuries of persecution and segregation, which a faction of the Iraqis believe the time has come to end once and for all. While Al-Maliki proposed dialogue with the Iraqi List and an understanding with the other wing in the National Alliance as a way out of the crisis, he disregarded the fact that such a dialogue and such an understanding will only produce a temporary settlement that will uphold the flaw while awaiting the next elections or the new wave of violence that will detonate the worst explosion. In this context, the experiences in Lebanon and Yemen are standing before our eyes. Today, Iraq is probably the clearest expression for a series of overlapping Arab crises, namely the crisis of the identity torn between national, sectarian or ethnic belonging, the crisis of transition from a state of tribal and sectarian tyranny to a modern Arab state for which it is difficult to find a good model, and the crisis of upholding independence in the vicinity of ambitious and hostile foreign powers. Moreover, his talk about the failure to prevent the suicide operation staged before the old Defense Ministry was fascinating, as it contained signs pointing to the lack of the element that unifies and justifies the presence of the state institutions, i.e. responsibility pure and simple, whether for the lives and security of the citizens or the submission to their accountability, seeing how it is said that “the people” are the source of all authorities. Al-Maliki's visions for the handling of these crises were merely limited to a few general statements that would fit all times and places, while at the same time void of any content that could cure a deteriorating state of illness. Moreover, Al-Maliki's abstinence from tackling these details reveals something else, i.e. the spread of a general “rhetoric” that floats over the facts and realities and deals with them through allusions and signals, and not through touching and treatment. The disastrous aspect of the aforementioned rhetoric lies in the extent of its propagation throughout the Arab countries.
