Ever since before the United Nations Security Council imposed new sanctions on Iran, western countries have not ruled out their options for enabling a resumption of dialogue with Tehran in the post-sanction period. The big powers opted for the option of avoiding war against Iran, or against its so-called regional arms in Lebanon and Palestine in particular. Perhaps the sanctions will end up softening the Iranian position on negotiating with the international community over its nuclear program and its regional influence, instead of launching new wars, which will complicate the situation in the region. A resumption of western-Iranian dialogue after the sanctions, and because of them, has many channels. There is the Turkish-Brazilian initiative, which produced a deal on trading highly-enriched uranium in Turkey, via the International Atomic Energy Agency. There is also the possibility of renewing meetings between the 5+1 countries and Iranian officials, and even the possibility of bilateral US-Iranian meetings; these were on the table before the sanctions, but Tehran rejected the idea. The post-sanction phase will also be a test over stepping up the dialogue between western countries, especially the United States, and Syria, based on the western wager on pushing Damascus away from Iran, in the ongoing conflict between it and the international community. If this wager is subject to a test in the coming phase, it is because western countries that hope to engage with Syria would like to see the consequences of dialogue with the country become a source of pressure on Iran, to force it to make concessions. The “engagement” with Syria has floundered in recent months, because of the impression that Damascus is committed to its alliance with Iran, and will not bargain over these commitments in exchange for an improvement in its relations with the west, especially the administration of Barack Obama. This stumbling and this commitment were manifested after the tripartite summit that brought together Syrian President Bashar Assad, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hizbullah's secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in Damascus on 27 February. This was followed by accusations that Syria was supplying Hizbullah with Scud missiles, based on “serious enough information to raise concern, and not from an Israeli source,” as the Americans say. There was a delay in the posting of a new US ambassador to Syria, and also in the gradual removal of commercial sanctions on the country, after the two items had neared completion. Washington re-drafted an agenda of engagement with Syria, and Iraq slipped down on the ladder of priorities, to the benefit of Washington's determination to see Damascus not oppose the sanctions on Iran, not pressure Lebanon into voting against the measure in the Security Council, and refrain from blocking Washington's efforts to resume peace negotiations on the Israeli-Palestinian track, through the George Mitchell mission. Washington was also determined to see Syria support the policy of stability in Lebanon, avoid using its old method of dealing with Lebanon's domestic situation conditions and interfering in it, and boost measures to control the borders with its neighbor. Damascus let the Lebanese find a way out, as they abstained from the vote on sanctions, instead of what the allies of Syria and Iran wanted, namely voting against them. The Syrian side has adhered to one of the items on America's “engagement agenda,” while two other items remain subject to give-and-take. Facilitating the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli talks, whatever happens with Syria, is confronting obstruction from the Israeli side, not to mention the important questions about Damascus' ability to support a Palestinian reconciliation in this regard, as long as Iran remains unenthusiastic about the idea. As for the test of Syrian policy in Lebanon with regard to controlling the border, or treating the issue of the armed Palestinian presence outside the camps, and other issues, Damascus will be subject to testing over the coming months, in light of Syrian rejection of taking any steps in the second framework, under foreign pressure.
