IT was during Sri Lanka's difficult do-or-die battle with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that former British foreign secretary David Miliband burst into the scene spouting unsolicited strictures on how the government and military should conduct themselves. Tensions between the two nations grew as London exerted pressure on Colombo to stop the offensive citing, among other things, rising civilian casualties. In response, Sri Lanka accused Britain of pandering to pro-LTTE groups desperate to save Tiger leaders by bringing about a ceasefire. Leaked US diplomatic cables have since revealed that some of Miliband's actions were motivated by a desire to win the support of expatriate Tamils living in key Labor marginal seats. Miliband and his government are no longer in power. Nevertheless, the dramatic slide in UK-Sri Lanka ties continues. And as one senior Sri Lankan diplomat put it: “Whether relations are strained or not, the perception (of strain) is itself an issue.” Now foreign policy analysts warn that the relationship will only worsen if the underlying cause of this widening estrangement is not addressed. Last week saw another low point in the uneasy marriage between the historic allies when British Defense Secretary Liam Fox abruptly “postponed” a private visit to Colombo. Fox, a close friend and supporter of President Mahinda Rajapaksa's government, cited an urgent commitment that arose during his official visit to Abu Dhabi. But he had confirmed months ago that he would deliver the 2010 Lakshman Kadirgamar Memorial Lecture – and when he pulled out a mere day before the event, his personal assistant was already in Colombo for his arrival arrangements. Just days before Fox backed out of this engagement, British newspapers reported that Foreign Secretary William Hague was annoyed about his colleague's proposed trip. The Guardian even claimed Fox would be defying the Foreign Office in proceeding to Colombo. As it turned out, this assertion was never tested. Quoting Whitehall sources, The Guardian said the main premise for the Foreign Office's objections was that Britain wanted to maintain pressure on Colombo for an independent war crimes inquiry into the manner in which the military conducted its final battle against the LTTE. But this, Colombo insists, is not the UK's – or anybody else's – business. If Downing Street wants to deal with Sri Lanka, it must do so on the basis of rebuilding the shattered North and East where much of the fighting was concentrated. The country, still rejoicing the end of 30 years of suicide bombings, assassinations, massacres and strife, is in no mood to stomach pontificating from an old colonial master. As for war crimes, Sri Lanka's position is that the Tamil Tiger rebels were solely responsible for any atrocities committed during the war. Not so, argues the pro-LTTE lobby in Europe. Having suffered a temporary setback in 2009 with the rout of the Tamil Tigers, diaspora organizations are fast regrouping. The LTTE is still listed as banned in Europe. And yet, the West evinces a paradoxical inclination to tolerate these lobbyists who converge frequently on public streets waving the conspicuous red-and-yellow rebel flag and shouting vituperative slogans against the Sri Lanka government. There were several such displays at the end of November when President Rajapaksa landed in London to deliver a speech at the prestigious Oxford Union (OU). Protesters not only parked themselves at Heathrow International Airport in anticipation of his arrival (the president was herded out through a separate, unobstructed exit), they also demonstrated outside The Dorchester in London where he lodged. To crown it off, President Rajapapksa then suffered an unprecedented embarrassment when the OU unilaterally cancelled his Dec. 2 address a few hours before the event. A spokesman for the union cited security concerns stemming from the enormous numbers of pro-LTTE supporters expected in the university town. During that visit, it was only Liam Fox from the British government that met President Rajapaksa although his office took pains to emphasize that this was in a private capacity. It seemed last week that even Fox has now developed cold feet. So where do the two nations go from here? Confidential interviews conducted to determine the official Sri Lankan position yielded two points. First, the government has always been receptive to any suggestions from “our friends abroad” on ways and means to further the best interests of all Sri Lankans. Proof of this was progress in resettling internally displaced persons, rehabilitating child combatants and the release of LTTE detainees. Second: “The constraint our authorities face is our partners in London for their part have not precisely articulated the matters that are irritating or perplexing them which have led to current issues in our relationship,” said a senior diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. “If those could be spelt out in whatever appropriate means, either through formal or informal channels, given our background of receptivity this government could see what could be taken aboard.” “If a gap has opened, we could try to bridge it,” he insisted. “Without the essential clarity, one is stymied from doing so. This is the conundrum we face. We want to strengthen all relationships, explore and broaden our horizons of friendship.” But is the Sri Lankan establishment truly ignorant about what the UK wants? The Sunday Times revealed in Colombo this week that British Prime Minister David Cameron had sent President Rajapaksa an explosive letter in November containing “unsolicited advice on good governance in Sri Lanka” together with felicitations for a second term in office. This only means that little has changed since Miliband left office. Some analysts see the collapsed relations as a result of Sri Lanka's political shift toward nationalism. The Rajapaksa regime has gauged that the painting of Britain as a conspiratorial, meddling imperialist is hugely marketable among the local electorate. Senior diplomats see this as a dangerous trend. “It is felt that the more unpopular you are in the West, the more popular you are here,” observed one senior diplomat who did not wish to be named. “Working diplomatically to that coefficient is a real problem.” But for there to be any positive change in UK-Sri Lanka ties, Downing Street would also have to sort out its policy toward Sri Lanka. At least Sri Lanka is convincing in its unbridled nationalism. In contrast, Britain's problem with Sri Lanka remains ill-defined. Ambiguous at best, muddled at worst. Is it a war crimes inquiry the UK wants? Is Britain irritated about Sri Lanka's new international alliances with some countries? Is there discomfiture over the prevailing state of human rights? Is it the domestic rhetoric in Sri Lanka that rankles? Or is Britain just confused about how to tackle pro-LTTE diaspora groups who, buoyed by their recent successes, are intensely lobbying the UK government to sideline the Sri Lankan government. Sri Lanka's position on the diaspora cannot be too clear. The UK must encourage the diaspora to play a constructive role rather than a destructive one. More must also be done to recognize the abhorrence of the Tamil Tigers, and to get the diaspora to accept that. If Downing Street fails to recognize that the pro-LTTE diaspora wishes nothing but ill for Sri Lanka – and if British politicians are to be guided by Tamil voters supportive of the Tigers – we might as well pound that last nail into the coffin now. The writer is a senior political analyst based in Colombo __
