TURKEY's constitutional court has decided to hear a case aimed at shutting down the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which state prosecutors have accused of harboring a hidden agenda to build an Islamist state. They cite the recent repeal of the ban on women wearing headscarves in universities as a case in point of the attempt to overthrow the secular order. As we wait for the court's decision, the universities are in turmoil, with some rectors insisting they would go to jail before allowing headscarved students into their classrooms. They see these young women, who are only seeking an education, as a threat to the secular system. Others see the new law repealing the ban as completely in accord with Article 26 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Magna Carta of the modern world, which calls for not only the freedom of religion and expression but also the right to education. What is really behind the headscarf controversy and the case before the constitutional court? The answer to this question lies in the fundamentals of the Turkish project of modernization. This project was designed by the European-oriented elites at the center of Turkish power in the early 20th century. It has, by and large, been successful, facilitating material progress and forging a unified nation by achieving the homogenization of society, thus creating a distinct Turkish identity. Turkey's modernization project also entailed a scientific-based positivistic understanding of the world, thus promoting a nonreligious Western type of society as the precondition for progress. This positivistic approach, however, created public/elite, periphery/center dichotomies. The general public remained religious while the elites were secular; the European-oriented elites at the center adopted a commensurate style of life; the largely Anatolian public remained non-European in their orientation. Because of this enduring division, the periphery developed its own parallel set of elites, businesses, institutions and media over the course of modern Turkey's existence. Not surprisingly, since Turkey is a democracy despite periodic military interventions, the majority in the periphery, led by the AKP (which gained allegiance because of its religious sensitivities), finally came to power in 2002. Also, not surprisingly, this has caused a reaction among the central elites who face the loss of power. Neither the AKP government's adoption of Turkey's commitment to become a full member of the European Union nor the government's embrace of the principles of a liberal economy, not to speak of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's personal assurances, have been able to convince the skeptics that what is going on is not an Islamist takeover that is against modernity, but the fulfillment of democracy as part and parcel of the unique Turkish route to modernity. It is in this context that the headscarf has indeed become a symbol – a symbol of fear used by the displaced elites to mobilize support against those from the periphery entering every sphere of society, demolishing the status quo and the invisible walls. The elite equates the removal of the headscarf ban with their removal from power as the guardians of modernity in Turkey. Oddly, the central elites don't seem to see the irony in the fact that they are defending something that is anathema to the very idea of modernity. As is well known, the project of modernization only succeeds if it is adopted by every part of the society. And the universities are the temples of modernization. It is obviously irrational from this perspective to open the doors of the university to some, but then close them to others because of the prejudice that a modern mind cannot be covered with a headscarf. The findings of a recent survey taken in nine provinces of women expelled from universities because of the headscarf ban shows that 99 percent of them, who were supposed to be hostile to dominant modern values, think that women should be able to choose their husbands. Eighty-six percent of them think that women should work and be economically independent. Most think that the way one chooses to dress should not be a determining factor when choosing friends. As an academician who taught before 1997, when headscarved students were able to attend universities, my personal observation is compatible with these findings. The headscarved students who came to the universities as the less-socialized children of conservative families have graduated from their schools equipped with universal values. Along with their religious sensitivities, they have adopted strong affiliations with the secular system and have been “mentally modernized” for years. Consistent with these findings, a recent Gallup survey conducted in Muslim countries reveals that Turkey is among the few where a majority rejects the application of Shariah law in governance. This survey is testament to the fact that wearing the headscarf is preferred not as a political challenge to the system but as a mere observance of religious belief. In light of this data, supporting the ban on the headscarf as a way of protecting modernity has farcical aspects. The claim that the secular system is being challenged by the sinister force of women students wearing the headscarf is belied by the reality that devoted Muslim men are allowed to attend the university and even work in government offices without constraint. Needless to say, this is problematic both in terms of the modern goal of gender equality as well as plain old logical consistency. Turkey is in the midst of transformation to a new, broader and more participatory political environment based on democracy and secularism. The digestion of this transformation – which means the acceptance of the plural, hybrid nature of our globalized world in place of the homogeneous flattening of culture envisioned by positivist notions of modernity - will be painful and take time. But inevitably, it will be accomplished. – Global Viewpoint __
