Zoubaidi was not a prominent name in the southern political landscape. But he capitalized on the security and political vacuum in southern Yemen, as well as the legitimate government's focus on the Houthi coup, to establish a parallel entity outside the framework of the state. He consistently raised separatist slogans—sometimes even racist ones—fueling division, violence, and instability across southern governorates. Thus, the threat to Yemen's unity has not been limited to the Houthi rebellion in the north; but it has also expanded internally through parallel projects that carry alluring political slogans. They mask a deeper agenda: weakening the state and eroding its institutions. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has transformed into a de facto authority, imposing its decisions by force of arms. It has become not only a threat to Yemeni security and stability, but also a poisoned dagger in the very back of the southern cause—prompting many southerners themselves to reject Al-Zoubaidi's actions and call for his trial as a traitor to their rightful aspirations for justice. Despite being granted opportunities to engage in the political process—including participation in the government, the Presidential Leadership Council, and the upcoming Saudi-hosted South-South dialogue—Al-Zoubaidi reneged on every one of them. After issuing initial messages of support, he mobilized his forces to seize Hadramout and Al-Mahrah, further fracturing the southern front and even dividing the STC itself. His own followers have begun to question his erratic stances and his alignment with destructive foreign agendas—exposed by actions that reveal a dangerous duality between the language of partnership and the reality of rebellion. Eventually, he fled to Somaliland, and then to Abu Dhabi. Perhaps the most damaging blow to the southern cause was its reduction to a single entity and a single man. Instead of becoming a unifying national movement, the cause was confined to Al-Zoubaidi's persona, excluding or marginalizing historic southern political, tribal, and civil actors. This fragmentation diluted the cause's objectives and distorted its image before both local and international audiences, turning it from a rights-based movement into what appeared to be a secessionist project. Al-Zoubaidi's reckless strategies have mortgaged the rights of southerners to conspiratorial agendas that are now widely rejected. Even among his supporters, the STC is increasingly viewed as a proxy tool for external actors aiming to transform southern and eastern provinces into staging grounds for turmoil and disruption within Yemen. Most dangerously, Al-Zoubaidi's approach placed the citizens in the south in direct confrontation with a legitimate government striving to reclaim national sovereignty. His actions have contributed to eroding public trust in state institutions. Worse, the internal strife has distracted from the national battle against the Houthis—scattering political and security efforts and giving the rebels in Sana'a time to regroup and consolidate power. The danger posed by Al-Zoubaidi lies not just in separatism, but in the broader weakening of Yemen's state structure at a critical historical juncture. The relationship between the STC and the Houthis is no secret. The rebels welcomed Al-Zoubaidi and even called him "a cousin." Both movements—secessionist and insurgent—have deep-rooted ties, including training in Hezbollah camps and alignment with similar foreign-backed agendas. Al-Zoubaidi's unilateral actions are not merely political postures; but also systematic steps to dismantle the state. From forming militias outside official command structures to seizing sovereign institutions in Aden and creating parallel administrative bodies, he has stripped the concept of partnership of any real meaning. Instead of being the foundation for rebuilding Yemen, the south has thus become a stage for competing factions. His actions have also triggered new flashpoints in Hadramout, Shabwah, Abyan, and Al-Mahrah. Attempts to impose a new reality by force have been met with local and tribal rejection—resulting in clashes and casualties, deepening instability, and exposing the fact that this chaos is not a byproduct, but the essence of Al-Zoubaidi's exclusionary, authoritarian project. What Yemen faces today is the danger of continuing to treat rogue factions as political partners despite their subversive and coup-like behavior. This has only emboldened Al-Zoubaidi and his backers to press on with their unilateral moves, believing that military power can grant political legitimacy. But experience has shown, time and again, that any project not rooted in national consensus and institutional legitimacy only yields violence, fragmentation, and state failure. There is no doubt: Al-Zoubaidi has betrayed his country. Far from being a stabilizing force—as some propaganda once portrayed him—he has emerged as one of the key drivers of national disintegration. His policies have exacerbated divisions, disrupted the legitimate government, and dragged the south from the hope of stability into the abyss of chaos. The only solution lies in dismantling exclusionary and separatist agendas, and returning to an inclusive national project—one that tolerates no armed groups outside the state, and no authority above the law. Al-Zoubaidi's flight is merely the end that awaits all, who gamble with their country's blood. And nothing is more despicable than betrayal cloaked in the name of liberation.
