Tuesday's stunning parliamentary defeat of British premier Theresa May is an indictment of London's handling of the negotiations for the UK to quit the European Union. In the biggest defeat ever inflicted on a UK government, May's long-argued exit deal with Brussels was tossed out by a majority of 230 votes. This is not, however, a demonstration of unity among MPs. Far from it. The members who rejected May's agreement had politicians who are dedicated to Brexit voting alongside Remainers, who still hope that they can keep the UK inside the EU and are pressing for a "People's Vote" which will reverse the Leave decision of the majority of British voters in 2016. Together with these there were opposition MPs, particularly from the socialist Labour Party, who hoped that May's defeat would force her resignation and a general election, which polls suggest might be won by the Labour party under the far-left leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. The key problem for May was that the deal with Brussels, in which she became closely involved, is a dog's breakfast of compromises with open-ended commitments to EU institutions, such as the European Court of Justice and the Customs Union, while London would have to give up its seat in Brussels and any ability to influence the laws and rules by which it would still have to abide. May will probably go down in history as one of the most hapless of British prime ministers. She took office when David Cameron resigned following the Brexit vote. Even though she had opposed the UK's EU departure, she promised electors "Brexit means Brexit". Saying she needed a stronger mandate, she called a fresh general election which she all but lost, only being able to form a government with the support of the ten MPs of the Ulster Unionist Party. Thereafter the exit negotiations in Brussels were bungled. The EU refused to include any talks about trade until the political issues had been agreed. These included May's agreement to pay some $50 billion to the EU largely in recognition of outstanding long-term financial commitments. This significant figure was conceded even though it was completely unclear what sort of a trade deal would finally emerge. With her wafer-thin parliamentary majority, May was negotiating from weakness. However, from the outset, Brussels was intent upon playing hardball, for the very good reason that no other EU member state had ever sought to leave the Union and the EU Commission wanted to make such an example of the British, that they would not only be the first, but also the last country to quit. London looked for compromises and received none. May weakened herself further by refusing until late last year to start putting in place emergency measures in case there was no deal. Walking away and trading with the EU under standard World Trade Organization rules is not an option favored by most MPs, a large number of whom never wanted Brexit in the first place. Yet this is odd, since EU countries sell far more to the UK than it does to them. The inevitable disruption of No Deal would be short-term, even though pro-EU MPs are talking about "crashing out" of the Union. The one activity at which the British have always excelled is "muddling through".
