From the start, the six-point peace plan Kofi Annan drew up to stop the fighting in Syria never got off the ground. Everyone agreed to it but no one did anything about it. And in consequence, he got nowhere with it. So it has come as no surprise that Annan has called it a day as international peace envoy for Syria. Annan's mission, begun five months ago, never took hold, and, worse, was made to look irrelevant as fighting intensified in Damascus, Aleppo and elsewhere. There is no doubt Annan tried mightily. Essentially a man of peace with no particular inclinations one way or the other, Annan had the political stature to perhaps turn the tide. His was a long road but there was a view that his diplomacy might offer the only peaceful way forward. Annan's dogged commitment to diplomacy at a time when all avenues for dialogue with Bashar Al-Assad seemed to have been exhausted was also a big advantage. However, almost nothing came of the plan. Perhaps the biggest problem was that it did not have enough bite. Annan ruled out the use of force (external or otherwise) in Syria, warned against arming the opposition and made no call for Al-Assad to stand down or even delegate authority to a deputy, as called for in the Arab League peace plan. Instead, his mandate called for an immediate end to the killings in Syria, humanitarian access for UN and other agencies and the start of a political dialogue between regime and opposition. There was no mention of punishment for those who broke the rules or ceasefires. No repercussions meant that the parties could do or not do pretty much what they pleased. The June 30 Geneva conference called by Annan represented his last chance to get world powers to agree to a peaceful resolution. The effort failed because of the same issue that sunk every potential international rescue in the 17-month revolt: disagreement over the fate of Al-Assad. The conference was Annan's last desperate throw of the dice. By then though, things had spiraled out of control in Syria as the fighting for its two largest cities forced the country's rapid slide into full-scale civil war. Annan correctly suggested that the continued arming of all sides in the conflict and the Security Council deadlock had undermined his ability to pursue a diplomatic solution. Syria's government and the opposition agreed to his peace plan on paper only to destroy it once they hit the pavement. Among these extraordinary difficulties, Annan cut a lonely figure. How he was meant to navigate these rapids to reach a peaceful shore is anyone's guess. Most observers thought it beyond him, or any other diplomat. Annan's resignation will only cement the perception that, deep down, the international community remains skeptical about the prospect of real political change in Syria. In fact, his decision to bow out is clear proof that the political process has failed. Given his track record, Annan never wanted to send a message that there are no near-term prospects for a ceasefire in Syria, but that appears to be exactly what he has done.
