There are many similarities between the Iranian stances vis-à-vis the crisis of the nuclear program and the manner with which the authority deals with the ongoing domestic crisis since last June's elections. These similarities stem from the "self-righteousness" mentality which apparently controls the ruling institutions' apparatuses. This mentality is characterized by its emphasis on monopolizing all values, claiming knowledge and wisdom, and adhering to righteousness "like the ring adheres to a finger." Therefore, this mentality inevitably classifies the opponents as ignorant, negligent and unaware, putting them in the same category as the enemies, agents, and traitors. Upon reading the statement issued by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard yesterday, one would effortlessly feel that this institution – which replaced the Hawza School in Qom as a key leader for the country and its people – has become imprisoned by a state of "self-righteousness" that prevents it from seeing the crises engulfing the Iranian regime, and which this regime and its policies are to be held responsible for. Although it is true that the recent turmoil in Iran does not imply that the regime will inevitably fall tomorrow morning, it is also true that by limiting the solution for the political problem with the opposition - which still insists that it belongs to the Islamic Revolution and its values and still considers Ayatollah Khomeini as its symbol and idol – to security means, and sending messages to the opposition through assassinations, such as the killing of Mir-Hossein Moussavi's nephew, deprives the authority from the card of the political dialogue with a number of Iranian forces. These forces do not want to destroy the experience of the revolution and do not adhere less than the current authority to the nuclear program and Iran's rights to peaceful use of atomic energy. On the one hand, insisting on rejecting a political dialogue, describing the domestic opponents as treacherous, and threatening to liquidate them – as the Pasdaran statement suggests – as well as other shameful trials over the past months, are practices that give the impression that the current government run by the Revolutionary Guard is not concerned about the domestic objections. On the other hand, these practices show that the government does not take into account the stands of the religious references after Supreme Guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sided with it completely. A question might arise here about the future of the position of the Republic's guide and thus about how the regime would be like if Khamenei disappeared for some reason. If we ponder over the alternatives available for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his allies, we could assume that the [upcoming] position of the guide will be another cause for a clash between the conflicting currents within the regime. Ahmadinejad's approach and his manner of dealing with the nuclear program's issue seems derived from the same book of political instructions which revolves around self-righteousness. The Iranian authority has gone too far in maneuvering in this regard and attempted to act smartly in a way that goes beyond its abilities to present explanations that contradict the undeniable realities. Iran's insistence on rejecting all the initiatives and "packages of proposals" put forth by the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency among others has embarrassed its allies, namely Russia and China, who broke their silence, announced their displeasure with the Iranian behavior, and backed any new sanctions that might be imposed on Tehran. On the one hand, the abovementioned behavior perhaps comes in the framework of an excessive feeling of power, especially amid the Western hesitation and Arab absence (in Iraq for example). But on the other hand, shutting the door before settlements and solutions and negotiations prompts us to consider the descriptions given for the Iranian policy, such as "smart" and "prudent", as well as the unparalleled skills of the trader of the bazaar and the carpet weaver…
