Dismantling a new cell in Morocco to attract potential volunteers to Iraq is not surprising. The shortest way to join the opponents of the US presence there is through the Al-Qaeda organization in Iraq. The most hostile organization to the US presence in the region is represented by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In addition, the penetration among the Maghreb immigrants in Europe constituted a breeding ground to collect firewood for the terrorism fire which is raging elsewhere. The new aspect in the agenda of the dismantled cell this time is that it was in the process of recruiting activists to head to Somalia and Afghanistan. While the nostalgia the Arab Afghans feel towards the homeland where they were imbued with radical concepts on Jihad is understood for many considerations that accompanied the phenomenon's growth - ever since the Jihad against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan did not provoke any sensitivities - changing the direction towards Somalia remains notable. It is an indication that this country will be the most attractive destination for volunteer activists, thanks to the lack of stability and the failure of reconciliation efforts among the feuding organizations. Besides, Somalia's situation in the absence of security and central authority and the least requirements of the state paved the way for the extremist organizations that seek a safe haven. The involvement of the United States and Western countries in the crisis, the expansion of the phenomenon of piracy, and the resort of Al-Qaeda members and other fugitives to the country of war and hunger, led to the increase in the number of volunteers who are willing to fight America and the West from outside their own homeland. They were encouraged by the fate of the American presence in Iraq and the Afghani quagmire, let alone the explosive situation in Pakistan, where the extremist trends had the upper hand in producing extremist ideas and organizations. There is no doubt that leaving Somalia face its ordeal alone has allowed the tribal and ethnic leaders and the war traders to consolidate the situation of non-state, just as the case was in Afghanistan before "Taliban" and "Al-Qaeda" took over. The Western efforts are unlikely to succeed in controlling the situation, which is expected to witness more chaos, fueled by the tendencies of a conflict which is about to turn from a war against terrorism to large-scale confrontations with religious background. The mistake of the Western theorists and military experts and the engineers of the confrontation strategy against terrorism and extremism was perhaps that they draw the maps in air-conditioned offices, away from the facts that influence the reality and the battlefield. There are experiences that were not taken into account, namely the roles assumed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and some Arab states that are able to quell feuds and bridge the chasm, with them being closer to the logic of understanding the backgrounds of these crises. Certainly, just as there were disadvantages of the OIC retreat from addressing the situation in Afghanistan, the Arab League's abstention [from playing an active role] and the fact that it contented itself with watching what is going on in Somalia for many years, had worse repercussions. Treading over the normal roles of the Arab and Islamic worlds – even if the aim was to weaken the nation and undermine its conduct in alleviating the regional and international crises, was not without a price. Power, regardless of its size and quality and technological aspect, is of no use in a conflict based on ideas, no matter how credible or correct they are. Wisdom requires that incorrect ideas turn on themselves through the logic of persuasion and conviction. The convictions that led many volunteers descending from the Maghreb to join the ranks of the Afghan mujahidin during the cold war did not fade away; they were trained at the time to use weapons and explosives in the Arab Afghan own camps. Their journey ended in them returning back home either detained or repentant, before they headed again to Iraq after the US invasion. This means that the repercussions of the phenomenon continued to exist, and the attempts to integrate them or deter them failed to put an end for this phenomenon. The attempts were more influential than those extended to address the phenomenon of the Arab Afghan, which produced more extremist organizations. Perhaps the most serious aspect is that it turned to human bombs that are eager to explode at any time, from Iraq to Afghanistan, and from Somalia to the coast, south of the Sahara.
