The suggestions put forth by Iran declare its willingness to negotiate with the West over a large number of issues, with the exception of the nuclear program. President Barack Obama's administration has agreed to a new round of negotiations despite escalation in the Israeli discourse that threatens to aim a strike at Iran's nuclear facilities that would be sufficient to delay the program for at least a year or two. The negotiations, which the Americans assume will arrive at tangible results by next December, will be tantamount to extending the “opportunity” granted Tehran by Washington, which expires at the end of the current month of September. Yet there is a paradox in the Iranian and American approaches. Indeed, according to Iran's Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei, abandoning the nuclear program would be equivalent to the regime collapsing. And such discourse comes in the context of a series of threats aimed at the interior and at foreign countries of the consequences of opposition forces going too far in escalating their protest movement against Ahmadinejad winning the presidential elections, which were marred with major violations. As for the suggestions, they do not address the program, considering that the discussion on this issue had been “closed”, as have decided a number of Iranian officials who are, nonetheless, prepared for dialogue that might include Iraq and Afghanistan, reaching up to banning nuclear weapons “wherever they may be”. The paradox can be summed up in that any agreement that can be reached over these issues will find Iran's stance towards it vastly different in case Iran were to obtain a nuclear bomb. In other words, Tehran wants to negotiate over its regional and international standing and consecrate strategic gains while threatening with weapons it has not yet manufactured, or what is referred to as “buying the bear's fur before it is hunted”. Needless to say that stripping Iran of the ability to obtain a nuclear bomb would bring profound changes to the current geopolitical scene in our region of the world. Hence, Tehran insists on reinforcing its regime and its positions near and far with a number of realistic elements (shutting down the Straight of Hormuz and threatening the routes of oil supply, Hezbollah in Lebanon, etc.) as well as hypothetical ones (nuclear weapons). Tehran also realizes that being consecrated as a regional superpower requires it to pay a price, equally out of its own pocket and that of its allies. Here the question arises over how badly it wants to ascend to the podium of influential states in the region and the world, and over the costs which Tehran patiently waits for the pains of paying. The basis of what the Iranians are thinking relies on making use of the rounds of dialogue over secondary issues with the West and on making the utmost use of the time to get closer to the critical technical point, i.e. that which crossing would mean that the nuclear bomb would be virtually part of Iran's arsenal. The Obama Administration does not wish to advance towards yet another quagmire into which the Middle East would sink. It also knows that an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities will mean giving enough of a pretext for Tehran to justify manufacturing the bomb, whether such a strike delays the progress of the nuclear program or speeds it up. The Western mood, on the other hand, does not seem likely to continue playing the game of the Iranians buying time to no end, noting that the available options, except for that of military action which has so far been rejected, are not characterized by the desired efficiency, because of the extent of Russian and Chinese support for Tehran. Best to say that the complex course taken by the Iranians, wagering that the West will not succeed in following them through it or in bringing them out of it, requires an amount of deception and arrogance that is greater than that which Iran's realistic capabilities allow.
