The state and its institutions in Lebanon have reached a state of fragmentation, obstruction and decay unprecedented even during the darkest days of internal infighting. And as surreal as it may be, the current government situation only represents the tip of the iceberg. There is a prevalent tendency to hold responsible for such a state of affairs all of the Lebanese, who have not yet been able to agree on how to live together and govern their country. It is as if the Land of the Cedars were witnessing mere political disputes over shares of power and government – disputes that could be overcome simply by reaching an agreement on how to share power. Yet the current situation in Lebanon has gone far beyond the phase, in which power-sharing would have been possible. The crisis of forming the government cabinet might be considered to best represent such a state of affairs. Indeed, the President of the Republic (i.e. the Christians in general) and the Prime Minister-designate (i.e. the Sunnis in general) are seeking after a tripartite formula in which Christians, Sunnis and Shiites would hold equal shares (8+8+8). However, Hezbollah wants to have the constitutional power to obstruct from within the government, by demanding to hold one third plus one of the ministers in the cabinet. In other words, it is declaring its resolve to continue holding decision-making powers, especially in terms of obstructing government action it might disapprove of, as well as in terms of maintaining its hegemony over the Lebanese state's decision-making process. This may well be true, especially that there are many challenges awaiting the Lebanese government, such as funding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) that members of Hezbollah of having assassinated former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, or the issues connected to oil exploitation, and commitment to stay dissociated from the conflict in Syria. Certainly Hezbollah is concerned with these issues and wishes them to be settled in accordance with the interests it represents. Its hegemony over government decision-making is therefore of great importance to it. Yet in reality, Hezbollah's behavior in Lebanon exceeds such a view, based on immediate interests, to something far beyond it – to taking control of all key positions in Lebanon's state institutions. Indeed, it monopolizes decision-making in state institutions and state services that have become affiliated to it, and seeks to obstruct it in those institutions and services that still resist its control, among them the government cabinet, the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces (ISF) and its Information Branch, for reasons not unrelated to the general state of confessional alignment. It would not have been possible for Hezbollah to drive the situation in Lebanon to such a state of affairs, had it not worked diligently, deliberately and on multiple fronts to dismantle the country's state institutions and restructure them according to its own vision. Hezbollah has worked, with support from Iran and Syria, to create vacuum in the Lebanese state and its institutions, so as to be able to fill it when the time is right. That is what has taken place over the many long years since the declaration of Hezbollah's founding, by gradually chipping away at the state, its sovereignty and its responsibilities, and channeling this to Hezbollah and its own services –not just at the military level, but at every level. Every time Hezbollah would achieve another "victory", it would further eat away at the state and at its sovereignty. The situation in Lebanon has become so corroded and fragile, that it could collapse at any moment, in such a way as to never rise again. That is what is being expressed, at the moment, in the form of fears that constitutional vacuum would ensue if no new government cabinet is formed, under a caretaker government. Yet vacuum such as this is required by Hezbollah, because the latter alone among Lebanon's political forces has the ability to fill such vacuum, after having long worked to create it. But why does Hezbollah not step up now and seize power, the latter having become ripe for the taking? Most likely the issue goes beyond apprehensions about taking control of Lebanon to Iran's regional and international considerations. This is especially the case, as Tehran is once again engrossed with the West in a diplomatic game regarding its own nuclear issue and that of reaching a settlement in Syria. As long as Iran is not forced to settle these issues quickly, or as long as the features of settlements remain unclear, the situation in Lebanon will remain an asset for compromise. And it would be preferable for formal responsibility for managing Lebanon's affairs to remain outside the scope of Iran's direct hegemony.
