The current Egyptian administration is invoking the anniversary of October 6, 1973 to confirm its legitimacy. The army that accomplished the crossing of the Suez Canal in that war, is the same army which, supported by millions of protesters, accomplished what some Egyptians call today ‘the second crossing.' By that they mean crossing from the tenure of the Muslim Brotherhood, which threatened – as they assert – Egypt's spirit, identity, and stability, into an Egypt that is committed to the core tenets of its identity, role, and to the original source of its regime's legitimacy. They say that the Egyptian army would not have been able to topple Mohamed Morsi were it not for that legitimacy it had gained among the Egyptians the day the October Victory was accomplished. Today, the Egyptian army summons the glories of October, as it engages the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorist groups. The Syrian regime, too, invokes the memory of the October War of 1973, recalling the legitimacy it had gained from participating in the war. The Syrian army, which fought fierce battles to liberate the Golan Heights, is the same army that is fighting today the opposition in a battle that threatens to raze all of Syria, having already leveled entire cities and villages, and annihilated legions of civilians. The war of 1973 bolstered the legitimacy of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes, which had joined forces in the war before taking different paths, when each tried to invest the newfound legitimacy according to its respective capabilities and calculations. I was not yet a journalist back then, so I will rely on a witness who knew the game and the players. In July 1994, I went to the office of Dr. Osama al-Baz, director of the Egyptian President's Office for Political Affairs at the old headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Over three meetings, Baz spoke at length. I published two episodes in Al-Wasat magazine from the material, but he asked for other things not to be published given their sensitive nature. I understood that President Hosni Mubarak was not comfortable with seeing a senior official in the state praise the role of President Anwar Sadat and portray him as a hero of war and peace at once. Baz said, "The story begins during the October War. The heroism of the Egyptian army and its sacrifices cemented the regime's legitimacy. The same happened on the Syrian front. The separation took place later, when each side sought to benefit from this legitimacy. The visit by President Sadat to Jerusalem can only be interpreted in light of the legitimacy he obtained in the October War. Only the warrior is qualified to make peace." He added, "Sadat came after a historic leader name Gamal Abdel Nasser. This is not a simple thing. Furthermore, Sadat, who was concerned about what history would say later, did not want to finish his term with Sinai still under occupation. One day, he decided to induce an electric shock in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The idea of visiting Jerusalem thus occurred to him. It was his idea, and don't believe that it was the idea of the Americans or any other side. He invested the legitimacy of the October War to induce that shock." He said, "Hafez al-Assad belongs to another school. The nature of his regime is different. Moreover, he does not belong to the majority in his country, unlike Sadat, which is a sensitive matter. Assad understood that he could not retake Golan by force, so he chose to wait. He exploited the legitimacy of October in improving the legitimacy of his regime and Syria's regional role. This role was practically based on holding Lebanon and the Palestinian card." Baz then remarked, "The legitimacy of October is not enough. You must always renew legitimacy through the ballot boxes and by improving the people's lives, and also by openness to the age and catching up with the world." Clearly, millions of Egyptians summoned the legitimacy of the October army when they feared Morsi's experience and the Brotherhood lexicon. It is no simple matter that the man who asked people for a mandate to fight ‘potential violence and terrorism' was General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who spoke as the leader of the army, albeit he was also the defense minister and deputy prime minister. The biggest challenge now is not only to suppress terrorism, but also to build institutions with popular and electoral legitimacy that are able to accommodate the vast majority of citizens. The Syrian army took a different path, cracking down from early on against protesters and shedding their blood. The Egyptian army, meanwhile, appears as though it was the solution or a part thereof. By contrast, the Syrian army appears today like it is part of the problem, albeit it will be ultimately indispensable in any solution that safeguards Syria's unity. But the fear would be for the solution to be delayed, where we would see Syria disintegrate after the dismantling of its chemical weapons. The October legitimacy is no longer enough.
