Mutual Spanish and British measures have once again brought the issue of sovereignty over Gibraltar to the fore, yet without reaching the edge of a precipice. To be sure, there is a threshold that disputes between European nations can never cross, and not only because the commitments to European unity impose a certain measure of solidarity and accord, requiring disputes to be managed through dialogue. Although Britain usually reacts strongly to what it sees as incontrovertible matters of sovereignty, as had happened during the Falkland crisis with Argentina, this time, its response was limited to sending a warship to drop anchor in the Mediterranean sea, to ward off any dangers. Spain responded by banning trucks loaded with stones from entering Gibraltar. Beyond that, the crisis will not escalate to more than mutual messages, to stress that Spain and Britain will respectively assert their sovereignty over the Rock, named after the Moroccan historic general Tariq ibn Ziyad. In a bygone era, ibn Ziyad burned ships to prevent his soldiers from sailing back, and accomplished a historic mission. It did not occur to him that the sea he crossed with his soldiers would become a buffer between different worlds – as evident from the fact that countries to the north of the Mediterranean resolve their problems by dialogue and accord, while the countries of the sea's southern and eastern banks confront one another with weapons and death. Indeed, if a tussle had erupted over something even less vital than the strategic British pene-exclave of Gibraltar between two Arab countries, the tragedy would have been much bleaker. The dispute between Madrid and London over Gibraltar also has another dimension, which has to do with what outcome the relations between two European countries that cling to their facts and arguments on sovereignty over the Rock can reach. Recall, for instance, that Britain and Spain did not go to the UN or the Security Council, or even the International Court of Justice, to obtain a ruling that would favor this or that side. Instead, they agreed to survey the views and choices of the population, though without imposing a specific time or mechanisms, but agreed to wait for the opportunity and the ripe conditions for a solution. Meanwhile, it is likely that the reason the issue has been brought back to the surface presently has something to do with the desire to benefit from the economic and financial crisis in Spain, which is now constrained by an even less margin of movement. It is self-evident that a referendum on self-determination remains the best possible formula for the people of Gibraltar to decide whether they are British or Spanish. This choice had more dimensions in the past, before Spain acceded to the European Single Market, which evolved into the European Union and then the single currency. Now, being part of the EU is safeguarded no matter the outcome. This is at the top of the things that allay division, in addition to the fact that Gibraltar's special strategic position has changed a great deal amid international transformations, and whether it is British or Spanish, Gibraltar's will be in line with European policies. A referendum over self-determination, which requires an agreement between Madrid and London, will not change the nature of existing bonds. And just like Spain tried advanced configurations for devolved rule, where northern and southern provinces have autonomy, while defense and security affairs of a strategic nature are under the control of the central government, the remoteness of Gibraltar from Britain has given it autonomy in managing its own affairs. It follows that there won't be a dramatic change in the balances between the two countries vying for sovereignty over the Rock, except to the extent that prompt the population to prefer this party over the other. Interestingly though, while Madrid agrees to negotiate over the future of the Rock with Britain, it refuses to discuss the issue of Ceuta and Melilla, which it occupies in northern Morocco, using the same logic. For several decades, Rabat has proposed discussing a solution that puts the two cities under Moroccan sovereignty, while maintaining Spain's economic and commercial interests in them. However, its initiative was never decently accommodated, although it is based on the principle of dialogue that tackles legal, historical, and strategic issues. While Spain clings to its demand of sovereignty over Gibraltar on the basis of geographical proximity, then it must at the very least accept the same principle in two cities located in a different continent, on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. On several occasions, Morocco linked the solution to its disputes with Madrid over the two cities to ending the dispute between Spain and Britain over Gibraltar, reckoning that an accord between Madrid and London ought to result in another understanding with Rabat. For this reason, Rabat closely follows developments between the two friendly European nations. But no doubt, Morocco does not want its traditional relations with its northern neighbor in the Iberian Peninsula to be affected by the repercussions of sovereignty disputes that never grow old. The outcome of the dispute between Madrid and London is likely to remain less troublesome. Rabat previously had a run-in with Spain over the Perejil (Laila) Island, when Spain moved its fleet threatening a war. Yet British ships dropped anchor in the Mediterranean, without provoking concerns.
