The developments in Egypt have exceeded all expectations and came as a shock, possibly to both the Muslim Brotherhood and the group's opponents. These developments shocked governments, intelligence agencies, journalists, and all sorts of observers. No one had anticipated that such dramatic events would unfold so quickly. Indeed, Egypt was under an elected president whose legitimacy was recognized by the whole world, and who had been welcomed by all the decision-making centers of the world's major capitals. Furthermore, the president had come from a group that was born eight decades earlier, and no one could deny its deep roots in the community. Last May, General Ahmed Shafik was unequivocal in his answers. He said that Mohamed Morsi would not finish his term. He predicted that the Muslim Brotherhood-led regime would collapse quickly, either after snap elections or a popular uprising, because this regime went against the spirit of Egypt. Shafik also said that the senior members of the Morsi regime would be put on trial, and spoke about the role of those ‘who came through the tunnels' in liberating Morsi from his prison, accusing them of other acts including killings during the revolution. Shafik was speaking from his temporary exile in Abu Dhabi. I published what he said, but I took it to be the words of a wounded man, especially since he was Morsi's rival in the presidential election. The Egyptian opposition could not have persuaded millions of citizens to flock to the public squares and the streets, if Morsi and with him the Brotherhood did not help rupture the thread that should otherwise be maintained between the president and ordinary citizens who are not members of his Islamist group. Indeed, Morsi ignored non-Brotherhood members among the citizenry. He did not pick up the signs, did not listen, and did not take initiatives. His conduct on issues related to the economy, security, and the judiciary helped hasten the rupture of the thread that usually protects rulers from being mere delegates of their parties or groups. Otherwise, the president loses his official capacity, which must go way beyond his legitimacy granted by the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. But on the other hand, the new administration must not forget that the supporters of the Brotherhood are part of the people. The new administration should remember that it must reach out to them, allay their fears, and open the door for their participation in the political process despite the current climate of confrontation. The most dangerous belief a ruler can hold is that the results of the elections allow him to dance alone with his party and group, classing his critics as enemies and dissidents as traitors. Democracy requires dialogue, listening profoundly, and correcting course accordingly. Instead, Morsi's conduct helped aggravate fears over exclusivity and imposition of the Brotherhood's ideology on all of Egypt, changing the country's spirit and tampering with its identity in the process. The president thought that his good conduct certificate came from the Brotherhood's ‘Guidance Bureau,' and not from the people who must sense that their president represents them and that he is seeking to improve their living standard. One can say that the Brotherhood made a series of mistakes. The first was running in the presidential elections without taking time to understand the burdens of running a country like Egypt. The second was helping cut the thread quickly with those citizens who are not members of the Brotherhood, without making any achievements that would make the president a symbol for solving crises, instead of his tenure becoming a source of crises itself. Today, the Brotherhood faces the prospect of committing a fatal error, by favoring bloody open-ended confrontation over admitting defeat, no matter how harsh. Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi could not have done what he did were it not for the fact that the thread between the Muslim Brotherhood and the majority of Egyptians had been ruptured. For this reason, the Muslim Brotherhood must think about its responsibility for Morsi's ouster. It must also think about finding a way out of the crisis, without plunging Egypt into a sea of blood. Moreover, the issue of the ruptured thread does not concern the Brotherhood in Egypt alone, but concerns the Islamist group's chapters in more than once place. The Brotherhood lost its previous status because of the ruptured thread with the citizen who does not belong to its camp. This loss has made the group vulnerable to a quasi-revolution and a quasi-coup. Morsi put himself under siege before the army did. The Muslim Brotherhood will not be able to overcome its current crisis unless it understands what happened on this basis. More corpses and more blood might blight Egypt and the new administration, but it will still not reinstate the Brotherhood into its previous position. Likewise, the new administration must learn from the Brotherhood's experience. It must realize that the tough conditions at present do not exempt this administration from reaching out to the Brotherhood's supporters, even if they choose not to listen at first. The new administration must understand that any firmness required by the current stage must also be coupled with solid efforts for holding fair and free elections that produce inclusive institutions, under a constitution that accommodates all Egyptians.
