Egypt is in a profound crisis, one that is open to all kinds of possibilities. But perhaps the most difficult characteristic of the crisis is the inability of any side to back down. Indeed, doing so in a situation like this is no less bitter than drinking from a poisoned chalice. Can we imagine, for example, President Mohamed Morsi returning to his post in the palace? What about the millions who descended to the streets on June 30, overwhelming the public squares, and settling the question of who commands a majority? What about the millions of signatures collected by Tamarrod? And above that, what about the armed forces and the ultimatum it issued to the president, before making its move after the deadline expired? There is no more room for half solutions or cosmetic ones. The president's return to the palace would mean the defeat of half of the people, if not more. It would also entail a resounding defeat for the military establishment, members of whom controlled the presidential palace for the last six decades. Neither would those behind June 30 accept a defeat of this kind, nor would the military establishment be able to bear such as blow. To be sure, Morsi's return would not mean at all that Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will be the one drinking from the poisoned chalice, but it will be the entire institution that he represents doing so. Such a victory for the Muslim Brotherhood would be immensely more significant than even their victory in the presidential election. It is also difficult to back down for the other side. The Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie cannot drink from the poisoned chalice either. At any rate, he would not be drinking the poison alone, and the Brotherhood would share his symptoms and pains. If he were to accept a defeat of this magnitude, people both inside and outside the group will revisit the records of the recent past, when the Brotherhood said it would not contend in the presidential election. That short-lived position was seen as a sign of realism and prudence, and as a message of reassurance for both internal and external actors. Near the end of March, the members of the Brotherhood's Shura council rallied around the Supreme Guide. The issue was grave and decisive: Should the Brotherhood put up a candidate in the presidential election, and what are the opportunities, risks, and costs of that? Opinions were divided during that meeting. Some feared that the move could be more than the Brotherhood could bear. Essam el-Erian, vice president of the Freedom and Justice Party – the Brotherhood's political arm – spoke for a full half an hour during the meeting. He said, "I was against putting up a presidential candidate, because it was very risky." The divergence was clear among the participants. In the end, the camp in favor of participating in the election, with Khairat al-Shater as candidate, won by 56 votes out of 110. I asked Erian, who was a member of the Guidance Bureau during the revolution, about the reports claiming Khairat al-Shater was the ‘strongman' inside the bureau. He said, "There is no such thing as a strongman for us. The Brotherhood's major strength is its institutional nature." I asked him who was leading the Brotherhood in that fateful period, and he replied, "The Supreme Guide. There is no one else. The Muslim Brotherhood, throughout its history, had only one leader who was in charge. Everyone would take whatever information or suggestions to him. But what is customary for the Brotherhood, unlike what people may believe, is that the Supreme Guide does not act alone, and must make decisions through the institutional frameworks." I do not mean at all that members of the Brotherhood have no right to run in the presidential race. But some decisions entail severe risks, because they go beyond an arena's ability to tolerate them. Prudence would have required the burdens of a transitional phase to fall on the shoulders of a neutral figure, and for the Muslim Brotherhood to content itself with seats in parliament and the government. This would have been better both for them and for Egypt. The Brothers' refusal to drink from the poisoned chalice may push them to gamble their fate and the fate of Egypt as well. I hope Vladimir Putin was wrong when he said that Egypt was sliding into a civil war, similar to the one taking place in Syria. I hope that Egypt would not slide into an Algerian-like scenario either, where the whole country would be drinking from the poisoned chalice. Meanwhile, the reader may ask whether Hezbollah's decision, too, was an extremely risky gamble. Who knows, he may ask about who would drink from the poisoned chalice later in that case as well.
