There are many similarities between Taksim Square in Istanbul and Tahrir Square in Cairo. The two have turned into headlines for the protests against the Islamization of the state, or rather its subjection to the Muslim Brotherhood's control, and on both squares, the army supported the liberal and secular parties in the face of the Islamic movements and organizations. In Turkey, the army's voice remained low and its role limited to the protection of public institutions, while allowing the demonstrations to express their opinions without using the oppressive approach seen throughout the history of protests in the Turkish cities. The Turkish army did not consider that these demonstrations – demanding the toppling of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government – constituted an opportunity to seize power again under the pretext of protecting the regime, as it was done by the Turkish army on previous occasions. Indeed, within ten years, the Justice and Development Party succeeded in leading the army back to the political House of obedience, thus limiting its intervention in the authority and forcing it to respect the legitimate electoral process, regardless of its results. In Egypt on the other hand, and through its current confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood rule, the army showed it still deemed itself to be the only power that could be trusted to protect the state and defend its higher interests and the only one entrusted with the future of the country, with a role exceeding that of the elected constitutional institutions, including the presidency. And when the army turns into a reference for the settlement of partisan disputes and the management of the state's affairs, this only means the collapse of the political process and the failure of the politicians to run their country's affairs. In that sense, the Egyptian politicians who perceive the army as being the savior from Egypt's crises, are neither serving the army nor Egypt. They should probably recall the role played by the Egyptian army under the three consecutive regimes that reached power since the coup of the Free Officers until this day. The longstanding role played by the Turkish army in suppressing the opposition voices and staging military coups encouraged the growth of the movements of political Islam in this country, reaching the arrival of the Justice and Development Party to power in Turkey with a vast majority. Similarly, the subdual to which the opposition movements were subjected in Egypt, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and the continuous falsification of the voters' votes and wishes, detonated the January 25 revolution that ended with the establishment of the MB regime about which its oppositionists are now complaining. True, the Muslim Brotherhood committed a mistake when it rushed to seize all the reins of the state, while considering that the small percentage by which Morsi won the presidency constituted a legitimate authorization for it to fully control Egypt's judicial, legislative, and media institutions. Nevertheless, the army is not the right entity to ensure the protection of the democratic process, whether in Egypt or in any other country. Hence, the Egyptian opposition is committing a grave mistake by seeking the army's help in the face of its Islamic opponents. It is firstly seeking the army's help against the results produced by the ballot boxes, and secondly disregarding the negative role played by the army (under civilian presidents) throughout decades, as the embracer and protector of the oppression of freedoms and the imprisonment of oppositionists, including the opposition figures who now deal with the army as their supporter. At this level, allow us to recall that the Egyptian army never once interfered to protect the freedom of one oppositionist, or save him from death or imprisonment, whether he was a liberal or an Islamist! In the end, the price of three more years of Muhammad Morsi's term remains lower than that of the army's re-assumption of a political role in Egypt, as this would constitute a lethal blow to the democratic process which was highly costly to the Egyptians before January 25.
