A rapprochement between Syria and Iraq is a red line, because it will change the face of the region. During the days of the Baath Party in Iraq, it was forbidden because it would change the balance of power in the Middle East. It would threaten those with interests [in the region], beginning with the US and not ending with the European Union. Many Arab countries believe such a coming-together would not be in their interest. It was forbidden during the days of the Shah because it represented a direct threat to the Iranian-Israeli-Turkish alliance. It is forbidden today because Baghdad's joining the Syrian-Iranian alliance would change the entire balance of power, from Damascus to the Caspian Sea, and beyond. In October 1978, Syria and Iraq signed a Charter of National Action, and in June 1979, I was in Baghdad when the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad visited the Iraqi capital and agreed with President Ahmad Hassan Bakr on unifying the two countries and parties, and on the formation of a united leadership that would take the place of the Higher Committee formed by virtue of the Charter. I did not believe that the “Abbasid Baath” would merge with the “Umayyad Baath”. In fact, less than a month after my return to Beirut, Saddam Hussein carried out a coup against Bakr (does anyone remember that he was the president of Iraq?). Saddam accused Syria of supporting Baathists, including some of the party's historic leaders, in their plotting a coup against the regime. He executed all of those backing the Charter, and unity, and their supporters. Saddam did not need to launch a coup against Bakr in order to rule. Saddam was Bakr's deputy, and pictures of the former filled the streets, homes, and hotel lobbies. Saddam's name was on everyone's tongue. His authority had nothing above it. It would be natural to conclude, then, that his direct goal was to end the agreement between Damascus and Baghdad, among other objectives, such as the launching of a war against the Iranian Revolution, which was welcomed by al-Assad. Bakr would stand against Saddam, as a military man who knew what wars meant. Saddam achieved his goal. He got rid of the Charter. He waged war against Tehran. He occupied Kuwait. The Iraqi people were subjected to a blockade, and the Americans then occupied the country; they got their hands directly on energy supplies and encircled Iran. However, with the stupidity of the Bush administration, they were surprised by Iran's influence, and that the leaders they had installed in Baghdad were pro-Iranians. The US now faced two tasks: keep Iraq away from Washington's enemies, Iran and Syria, and withdraw its troops without abandoning influence in Baghdad, or letting it ally freely with those who are considered against America's interests. Certainly, Syria intervenes in Iraqi affairs. It would be strange for it to not intervene, with 150,000 US soldiers on its borders. But political intervention and supporting the resistance is one thing, while being implicated in terror is another. We do not want to compare the stance by al-Maliki with that of Saddam. However, what al-Maliki did, one week after signing a strategic agreement with Damascus, obliges us to compare the two events. Any observer might read the situation in light of recent history, especially since earlier confessions had been aired on television screens, only to turn out to be false later on. Baghdad's choice of timing in escalating the situation and threatening to resort to the United Nations Security Council is something very significant, especially if we consider that it will not convene or take any decision without Washington's approval. Are the confessions broadcast by Iraqi television a form of US pressure on Syria? Has the dispute between the two sides gone this far, after a wide-ranging period of openness that surprised friends before it surprised enemies? For now, there are no answers to these questions. But what is certain is that any Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement or alliance between the two sides with Iran is not in America's interest, and it will try to end any attempt in this direction, even if the cost is a new war, in order to preserve the balance of power in the Middle East.
