A consensual solution for the governmental crisis in Morocco is better than returning to square one and organizing anticipated elections. Indeed, the political parties are not ready to go back to the ballot boxes. Besides, the deteriorating economic and social situation does not allow the staging of such competitions, especially since the overdue local elections might be postponed and the governmental crisis does not help ratify the regulatory laws going in line with the new constitutional situation. Between the wishes for royal arbitrage at the level of a crisis with a partisan character and the launching of dialogue between the two sides involved in the crisis, the Independence Party and the Justice and Development Party, the two partners in the governmental coalition prefer the second option. This is based on the fact that the crisis is not constitutional, but rather the result of political disputes over the approach, the work method and the priorities of the stage. So far, the Independence Party just settled for registering its withdrawal from the government as a partisan stance, without returning to the opposition ranks. It thus kept practicing its role in the government and parliament as an ally supporting the majority. In the meantime, and at the peak of the economic crisis, Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane needs wide-scale political backup to help him adopt reformatory measures which he describes as "painful," knowing there is nothing more painful for him than to find himself facing the opposition, yesterday's allies, the businessmen and the syndicates in a moment such as the current one. However, the gap generated by the partisan disputes, despite their widening, have not yet reached the level of severance. In the meantime, the thin line that can be maintained can turn - in case the opportunity is missed - into a noose wrapped around the neck of a government, which has not yet completed its second year. From a political viewpoint, the Islamic Justice and Development Party believes that its benefitting from the repercussions of the Arab spring qualified it to lead the government, and that whether with or without the Independence Party, it could have chosen its partners in the coalition which converges over the minimum level of required reforms. Hence, it could proceed with the implementation of the self imposed "painful" reforms, to the point where its leader Abdelilah Benkirane described the International Monetary Fund as being a key partner for his country in the accomplishment of a new series of corrective reforms. When using this card - despite its possible repercussions - he probably wishes to say that only he can risk his partisan and political influence to achieve these goals. Nevertheless, his opponent, the Independence Party, believes that this reformatory approach constitutes a crossroads between the adoption of palpable measures to ensure economic revival, encourage investments and handle the social files on one hand, and pursue the ready-made recipes of the international monetary institutions on the other. In addition, it is shedding light on stability-related concerns. Yet, the difference between a stability that includes balances within the governmental coalition and between tending to confront the possible threats, following unpopular reforms, resides in the partners' agreement over a consensual formula that takes into account the totality of the visions on the table. The governmental crisis is no longer related to the assessment of the past experience. Indeed, it now features accusations of monopolization, hegemony and the introduction of models from outside the country, in reference to Egypt and Tunisia. It has even started to prevail over the coming measures. At this level in particular, the partners in the governmental coalition can only rely on each other, and the more the elections are delayed, the more there is a chance to see cohesion - although reluctantly - in the absence of alternative options for the time being. The only reason for the opposition to completely exclude the possibilities for a participation of some of its members in the government instead of the Independence Party, in case it were to practically withdraw from the coalition, is because it believes that the implications of the crisis will limit the actions of whichever government. Consequently, the fact of awaiting the measures that it will undertake will constitute a test for its ability to persist, in case it is able to overcome the obstacles of the current crisis. On the other hand, in order for Abdelilah Benkirane to refute all that is being circulated about this management crisis, he will have to succumb to some of the demands of his opponent, the Independence Party. Naturally, were it clear in the opposition's considerations, that the current government will survive for a longer time, it would not have closed the windows and doors, and would have been optimistic, while not ruliing out the emergence of new crises within the government. To the same extent, the prime minister does not seem oblivious to such readings, realizing that the withdrawal of the Independence Party will inevitably cause the resignation or toppling of his government through a request to withdraw confidence from it. Therefore, this will provoke a subsequent call to stage anticipated elections. However, there are scenarios - which are not excluded - pointing to the fact that his party might acquire an advanced position, but nothing indicates that he will be selected as prime minister again. Besides, Hamid Chabat said that the dispute was with Benkirane and not the party he heads, thus indirectly hinting to possible scenarios, which is why the leader of the Justice and Development Party chose to engage in dialogue with Chabat's party over the repercussions of the crisis, and not on the governmental level or within parliament's sessions. All the conflicting sides want to tailor the crisis to suit their wishes and goals, the farthest of which being a return to square one. Indeed, nothing is excluded and nothing is constant.
