Erdogan left after giving the Maghreb leaders something to preoccupy them for a period of time that will definitely last longer than his short visit. And while the Islamic Justice and Development Party - the leader of the governmental coalition in Morocco - was counting on earning strong support from its Turkish counterpart, it merely reaped further disappointment and confusion. At this level, the Moroccan businessmen's boycotting of the Turkish official's visit, created an impression that the economic wager secured by the Turkish ally was not echoed in the dealings of Morocco's Islamists with the economic files in their country. Furthermore, embarrassment did not only affect Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane who was dubbed by his supporters "the North African Erdogan," but also extended to include the Turkish guest and the businessmen who accompanied him on this visit from which their Moroccan interlocutors were absent. The mistake was greater than a political slip in the first real test facing the current Moroccan experience. But Erdogan's image was also harmed due to the protests, which evolved into acts of violence and baffled the Turkish guest who did not come as a conqueror, but rather as reluctant or defeated person. It would have been difficult for Erdogan to cancel his tour in the Maghreb, which appeared to be outside the domestic context, just as it would have been impossible for him to conduct it with ordinary momentum. Indeed, he is aware of the fact that his political future depends on the Turkish internal scene, without excluding the external benefits that transformed the Turkish experience into an archetype for the Arab spring countries in which the Islamists have acquired mounting influence. Unfortunately for the Moroccan Justice and Development Party, its aspiration for that model featured reservations. Abdelilah Benkirane himself did not shake hands with his Turkish counterpart, even though he is free from any pressures and constraints. There was no dialogue between him and the businessmen, and the opposition factions boycotted his monthly accountability sessions before parliament. This made him face political protests that were different than the Taksim Square incidents in terms of the extent of the use of violence and mobilization on the street. But the two men met and converged in blaming the opposition and reiterated talk about settlement via the ballot boxes. In short, the choices of the voters, even if they are sound and democratic and are expressed via the ballot boxes, do not give utter freedom to the majorities. Indeed, there are always oppositions and minorities that do not surrender to the base, which eliminates any chance of them being heard. At the level of the Turkish experience, they are putting forward problematic issues related to identity and principles, while in Morocco they are based on the constitutional reference. Benkirane might have made a mistake by thinking that the ballot boxes had the final say, whereas his opponents believe that the momentum which accompanied the 2011 legislative elections was not as confident and enthusiastic. This is at least the argument they are using while monitoring every one of his slips. The Turkish prime minister is aware of the fact that Africa's gate cannot be opened without knocking on the doors of the North African fortresses. Just like the Europeans, he is following in their footsteps to open up to the Arab Maghreb region that leads deep into Africa. This is why he came carrying a mediation plan under the slogan of positive efforts, and tried to get involved at the level of the schism affecting Moroccan-Algerian relations against the backdrop of the repercussions provoked by the Sahara issue, the closing of the land border, and the divergence over numerous regional files. However, neither the timing nor the facts herald a breakthrough. On one hand, Algeria is currently going through an exceptional situation with the vacancy of the presidential chair due to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's illness, while on the other the file of Moroccan-Algerian relations is suffering from a stalemate and cannot be budged from square one. Still, Erdogan - who is aware of the extent of the difficulties - wants to guarantee a foothold for Turkish economy and foreign policy in a region that has become a monopoly for European influence, particularly France's and Spain's. By doing so, he wants to say to his country's European partners that Turkey is active with or without its accession to the European Union, in the face of European reluctance. But more importantly, the Turkish player, which guaranteed a seat in its regional surrounding, is yearning for greener pastures, although - once again - the timing was not in its favor. One example is the fact that his success will further increase the influence of the Islamists, a thing which Algeria perceives with discomfort. No visit has ever provoked as much controversy as Erdogan's tour in the Maghreb. Indeed, it has ended, but its local and regional repercussions remain. Perhaps its timing played a major role in containing the Turkish momentum, knowing that in the history of Turkish expansion, the Ottomans stopped at the Oujda gate on the border strip between Algeria and Maghreb. Today however, they are giving it another try based on economic and political influence. In the end, historical facts maintain their effect, which cannot be erased by time.
