We reject the bombarding of Lebanese lands and the killing of citizens with cross-border bombs regardless of who the attackers are and the religious and political affiliations of the attacked civilians. However, this rejection is not enough to make a full stand concerning the incidents seen at the Lebanese border areas in the Bekaa and the North. This is not lightning in a clear sky; therefore, the daily bombarding that is resulting in dead and wounded victims as well as material losses cannot be looked at separately from its political and security related repercussions. More specifically, one cannot ignore the fact that the army of the Syrian regime bombarded the villages of Akkar and its planes attacked the surroundings of the town of Ersal. Also, one cannot come up with excuses and justifications for the Syrian army troops who are violating the Lebanese sovereignty, while focusing on the fact that the Free Army and the Syrian opposition forces have been bombarding the towns near Al-Hermel area. The Syrian bombardments carried by both the opposition and the regime are an indication to the ill management of inter-Lebanese as well as Lebanese-Syrian relationships. Through their political institutions, i.e. the cabinet and the National Dialogue Authority, the Lebanese agreed to apply the politics of “self-distancing" when it comes to the Syrian crisis. Through the Baabda Declaration, they decided that they will not be part of any Arab axis and that they will not implicate their country in the Arab and international conflicts. However, the Lebanese national crisis soon found its way into this agreement just like it did with the rest of the domestic and external politics. It turned out that several forces are dispatching fighters, weapons, and funds to Syria, which is a clear contradiction to their previously announced stance. However, the different forms of the Lebanese involvement in Syria cannot possibly be deemed similar. The infiltration of untrained and poorly armed and unorganized groups (as indicated by the Tal Kalakh ambush) is not at all similar to the dispatching of heavily armed forces to the Syrian lands as indicated by the confrontations in Al-Kassir, and Rif Homs. The political responsibility for this difference is not limited to the military and technical aspect, but rather extends to the role and position of the two political sides that do not hesitate to clearly express their support for the conflicting Syrian parties. There is a broad difference between the weight of the armed Salafist groups in the North and the major importance of Hezbollah within the Shiite sect. There is definitely a difference between the dismantlement and poor organization of the former group and the steel-hard organization and decision-making of the latter party. Until recently, this party's secretary general was still reassuring the Lebanese people about his party's keenness on preserving national unity and shying away from sedition. The largest threat facing Lebanon when it comes to the flow of armed men in support of the two conflicting Syrian parties, is that the state is incapable of carrying out its simplest and most obvious tasks. The state, which is formed by the forces of the status quo, does not have the ability to implement its decisions. As always, it appears that the external pressure and the tendency to obey the orders of the regional forces – mainly those forces that wish to abort the Syrian revolution – are much stronger than the commitment to the national interest and to the interest of the conflicting sects who must strive to co-exist in peace instead of being sucked into the vortex of the stormy Arab transformations.
