Anything can happen at any time in Egypt. Thus, what happened yesterday at the Coptic cathedral did not come as a surprise, just as the violent events that preceded it by a few hours in front of the Supreme Court had been expected. The questions that Egyptians have in mind are no longer connected to explaining what happened, as they each have their own explanation, nor are they connected to expecting this climate – which pleases neither friend nor foe – to persist or to be dispelled. Indeed, many have the firm conviction that failure, confusion, unrest, poverty, clashes, protests, strikes and instability will remain as they are, and in fact even increase. People in Egypt ask about possibilities for the future, how it will be, and how long the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood will last. President Mohammed Morsi could cling to the Prosecutor General, Counselor Talaat Abdullah, despite any judicial rulings against him, and whatever objections may be raised among judges, in Public Prosecution circles, among the elites or in the street. Yet the decisions issued by the General Prosecutor will continue to be viewed with suspicion among most people, and the street will remain heated, angry and outraged. Even if it were to calm down for a while, it will return to erupt anew at every crisis Counselor Talaat Abdallah will be party to, or in every case in which justice will be a popular demand. President Morsi could keep moving forward on the path of parliamentary elections, whatever objections may be raised by the opposition on the laws governing these elections, the executive measures taken to hold them, and the legal shortcomings surrounding them. Yet the next parliament will not obtain the people's approval, nor will it be a reason for quelling civil strife and restoring calm to the street. Its legitimacy will be in question, and it will cause the situation to erupt on a larger scale. Its MPs will find themselves besieged within its walls again and again, and will be unable to leave through its gates, out of fear of the angry masses that will be surrounding it during sessions. They will be described as “custom-lawmakers" brought by the Muslim Brotherhood and the President to design a state tailored to the Brotherhood! President Morsi could also maintain Doctor Hesham Qandil's government until the end of his first term in office, despite its failure, its confusion, its decay... and its blunders. But the economy will worsen even more, the circumstances people live in will deteriorate even further, and the anger of the people will swell and grow. Protests will increase, sit-ins and demonstrations will escalate, and regret over electing Morsi and bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power will multiply. The lament of the hungry will expose the government, and the screams of the poor will be deafening. The spaces in which the President, his aides, his assistants, his devotees and his supporters can move around freely will become narrower, and the number of governorates and cities which the President cannot visit will increase! State utilities will be crippled by the spread of strikes and unrest. President Morsi could maintain his stance of rejection, anger and hatred towards opposition forces, whether in the Salvation Front or in other fronts, coalitions, political parties, civil institutions and youth forces. And he could persist in the manner he deals with these forces, taking no heed of them and sufficing himself with pointing to accusations implicating them in unlawful activities in every speech or interview. Or he could leave the task to his Muslim Brotherhood devotees of insulting and slandering them, or to security services of hunting them down and locking them up. But tensions will rise, violence will erupt, buildings and lives will be lost to fires, and the Muslim Brotherhood will not be able to enjoy for long a head office or the President a palace. The President, his supporters, and his devotees could “drag" even more journalists and media personalities to prosecution offices and courtrooms, pressure television shows and channels and shut down a few newspapers and satellite channels, or turn their seasonal siege of the Media Production City and the offices of newspapers into “permanent residence" around them. But the media's anger against him will grow, and international criticism will be detrimental to his rule. The journalists and media personalities who oppose him will not change their beliefs in order to please him, and perhaps some of them will leave the country, reappearing from far away only to increase their attacks... and their mockery, while safe from pursuit and far from the siege. The President could increase the rate of “Brotherhoodization", or what members of the Brotherhood consider to be restoring their rights to occupy high-ranking positions in the state. Yet disagreements with his allies will increase, and the rift will widen – the Al-Nour Party being an example. And the anger of other segments of the population will reinforce the conviction that the Muslim Brotherhood has simply replaced the National Democratic Party (NDP), adding new segments of the population to the list of those angry with the rule of the Brotherhood. What is this climate in which the President, his party and the group he is affiliated to, have placed themselves? What counterrevolution are they talking about? Does the President, or the leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), or prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Guidance Bureau, believe or imagine that the country will flourish under such circumstances and amid such a climate? Egyptians took to the street during the Revolution, chanting and raising a slogan they dreamt would be achieved in their country: “life, liberty and social justice". And they find themselves today having despaired of achieving the goals of the Revolution, having come to fear the collapse of their state, and searching for a chant for the nation!
