Under the pressure of opposition popular protests, the Ennahda (Renaissance) Movement in Tunisia has given up clinging to the composition of the government it had sought to form after the Constituent Assembly elections, and has given up “sovereign" ministerial portfolios, despite the fact that its leader, Rashid Al-Ghannushi, had in the past considered that giving up such portfolios would mean yielding to a conspiracy against the Revolution. And under pressure from the Judiciary, accompanied by ongoing popular movement in the street, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has given up on holding parliamentary elections at any cost and as quickly as possible, despite having tried to elude the Judiciary, after having eluded the opposition and its demands, considering that this electoral milestone would be the one to grant it absolute legitimacy to legislate, not the Shura Council which is currently in charge of this in the absence of the lower house of Parliament (the People's Council). In both cases, political Islam has recorded distinct regression, after having shown an insatiable appetite for power and control over its institutions. In both cases as well, such regression cannot be ascribed to a sense of democracy or to allowing for the participation of the opposition in reorganizing the country's affairs during the transitional period. Indeed, both Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood have at an earlier stage shown their willingness to enter into all sorts of alliances, including with Jihadist fundamentalist and Salafist Islam, which is by definition opposed to democracy and elections, in order to confront Secular and Liberal movements, whether in the street or at the ballot box. And with a political situation in crisis, and one open to possibilities of escalation and confrontation yet again between those in power and the opposition, being expected to persist, both in Tunisia and in Egypt, the regression undertaken by political Islam can be ascribed to it considering the domestic balance of balance to impose such regression. There are three main reasons that can explain the imbalance of power not in favor of political Islam. The first is the thirst for power shown by the new rulers, in a manner that has revealed, on the one hand, their intention to impose their hegemony and their control without any real partners; and on the other, their utter failure at finding any kind of solution, even temporary, to the political and livelihood crises that have been accumulating. Thus political Islam has seemed a failure in power, driving away voters who had granted it their trust at first, considering that it would be a model contrary to what the Revolution had risen against – only to discover that the way it exercised power did not differ much from the methods of the former monopoly, in addition to its lack of a program for governing and its inexperience in running the country's affairs. The second reason resides in the firmness of the stance taken by civil and secular society on the issue of democracy and the rejection of dictatorship. And with the exception of a few opportunistic figures with no popular representation, political Islam has not been able to attract any of the Civil, Liberal and Secular political parties. In fact, opposition has grown fiercer to plans of establishing the “religious" state sought by political Islam. Thus, the slogans of freedom and equality in citizenship and in civil rights have continued to echo in the streets of Tunisia and Egypt in an increasing manner, attracting greater numbers of those frustrated by the experiences of Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In other words, standing firm in confronting the wave of the “religious state" has made civil society stronger and more resistant. The third, and perhaps most important, reason is the fact that political Islam has not been able to break through to the military institution, neither in Tunisia nor in Egypt. This means it has not been able to take control of a machine of repression and violence to confront the opposition, and has not been able to impose by force what it failed to impose peacefully. Moreover, the experience of resorting to the police, this institution of doubtful loyalties, quality of armament and organization, has shown it to be ineffective at confronting the protest movement. Meanwhile, the military institution in Tunisia and in Egypt has repeatedly declared, whenever the need has arisen, that it was standing on the side of the popular demands on the basis of which the Revolutions had taken place, and that it would not take sides with any domestic political party at the expense of another. In other words, the institution that could have played the role of repressing popular aspirations has “let down" political Islam, and has maintained its neutrality so far – knowing that it is this neutrality that contributed to the toppling of the two regimes against which the Revolution arose.
