It seems that Ennahda, the Islamist movement in Tunisia, has begun to take notice that it will not be able to rule in the manner it had wagered on before. The group, through its leader Rashid Ghannouchi, has declared its consent to abandoning sovereign ministries to "independent figures". These ministerial portfolios include the Ministry of the Interior, which oversees security and elections. As is known, the interior ministry, according to what nearly is a Tunisian tradition, is the equivalent of the regime's bedroom. Indeed, it was from this post that Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ascended to the office of president. Likewise, this ministry was given, following the Jasmine Revolution, to Ali al-Arid because he is one of the most prominent figures of Ennahda. Therefore, this move suggests that building a police state is no more on the agenda. Meanwhile the authorities have identified the assailant behind the murder of leftwing opposition leader Chokri Belaid, and announced that they have apprehended members of the murderer's “radical religious" cell, and have an area along the border with Algeria surrounded, where the Salafi assailant is thought to be hiding. Even if this account of the authorities is somewhat thin, or entirely inaccurate, as some in the opposition camp believe, it remains clear that the authorities have felt the need to take action, which has helped curb security laxity. This has taken place in conjunction with hints by European and Western officials that imposing order and security is one of the most important conditions for investing in Tunisia, a country in dire need for foreign investments. On the other hand, it is becoming clearer that the potential political benefits from the Salafis, which Ennahda might reap, are much less than their potential harms, at all levels. This is particularly valid since it is now obvious they are impossible to keep in check within any binding political or security accord. Their recent attack on the Bourguiba Institute of Modern Languages, north of the capital – where they prevented students from performing the "Harlem Shake" dance, because "the Israelis are killing our brothers in Palestine and you are dancing" –, only fueled doubts about them and strengthened the desire to repudiate them. As part of the same climate, reports have surfaced confirming that Ali al-Arid, who has been tasked with forming a new government, has offered concessions to parties over issues related to the judiciary and the media. If this is true, it could be argued that Ennahda has really started to understand its own limitations, and that intransigence would only push the country into a large hole from which it would be difficult to get out. This tendency could be encouraged by the bad shape of the ruling political factions, in their internal interactions and the relations with one another. Within Ennahda itself, it is no longer a secret that Abdul Fattah Moro, the historical figure in the party, and Hamadi Jebali, secretary general and former prime minister, both have clearly different views from Ghannouchi. As for the status of the coalition with the Congress for the Republic and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberty, it is not at all alright. Let us not forget that Ennahda, in the end, controls only 89 seats out of 217 seats in parliament. But if the assumption that Ennahda has begun to see, hear and understand is true, then the main credit for this goes to popular opposition, both by youths, women and trade unions, which are astounding in Tunisia. The most important outcome of this is that the Tunisian revolution, despite everything, has been able to open a door to politics, and to civil-popular movements so that they can exist and rein in the power-hungry Islamists. This is, of course, if Ennahda is at all honest. Here, another question poses itself: When will Egypt's turn come?
