Not all of those who have taken to the streets of Tunisian cities are supporters of Leftist opposition figure Chokri Belaïd. Among these demonstrators are in fact many of those who had voted for the candidates of the Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance) Movement. They have taken to the streets following Belaïd's assassination, and on the occasion of his funeral, to declare their opposition to the direction taken by the country towards reproducing the former regime, whether in terms of hegemony over political life or in terms of dealing with members of the opposition. Certainly the leadership of Ennahda did not take a centralized decision to eliminate Belaïd. Yet the name of this activist who opposed the notion of the state which the Islamist movement seeks to establish was listed as one of those who should be eliminated by another Islamist group. As for the link between Ennahda's policies and such a list of eliminations, it can be found in the behavior of the movement's leadership. Ennahda has legalized what has been called “committees for the protection of the revolution", which have been allowed to molest all those who would voice opposition to Ennahda, especially journalists, under numerous pretexts and excuses. Members of these committees, which actually form a militia affiliated to Ennahda, have besieged government locations and centers, demanding the elimination of those they consider to be members of the opposition. Ennahda and its leaders have actually gone as far as to mention these committees in a constitutional text, which would turn this militia into a “revolutionary guard", representing a striking force in the hands of the Islamist movement to confront its rivals. In parallel to such a direction being taken, Ennahda, and especially its leader Rashid Al-Ghannushi, has not hesitated to flirt with Salafist movements of various strands. Here one could point to that famous recording of Ghannushi speaking to Salafist cadres, in which he complains that there are still in Tunisia a great number of secularists who dominate the press, the media and pivotal positions within the state. We thus find coupled incitement against opposition members and extreme leniency towards groups with violent tendencies, creating this “nurturing environment" for violence that Tunisia has been suffering from ever since the collapse of the former regime, through Ennahda taking charge of the transitional government, and up to the recent political assassination, an unprecedented event in the country's history since independence. Ennahda does not bear criminal and legal responsibility for this assassination, but it does bear political responsibility for the climate of incitement, the formation of militias, leniency towards violent practices and providing cover for unlawful practices. And it seems that the movement has not realized the significance of a figure of the opposition being gunned down in bright daylight, at a time when the country is going through the most profound political crisis since the establishment of the new regime. Indeed, it is clashing with its allies in the government cabinet, as well as with both the President of the Republic and the President of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA). It is also clashing with every formation of the secular opposition, as well as with the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT – Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail). In other words, it is clashing with all constituents of Tunisian society, who have come out to condemn its policies over the past few days. Thus, instead of seeking to find common ground with civil society groups across the political spectrum, it has clung to what it considers to be its electoral gains, relying primarily on its militia, which it has driven to the street yesterday to respond to the demonstrations denouncing the assassination of Belaïd. Such clinging has been expressed in the rejection by its Secretary-General and the country's Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali of the notion of heading towards the formation of a technocratic government which would quickly prepare for elections that would put an end to the transitional period. And regardless of the competence of such a government in resolving political, economic and livelihood crises, or in forming a national coalition government that would bring together the entire political spectrum to bear shared responsibility for getting across the transitional period, Ennahda's logic is based on monopolizing government work through a cabinet of political parties of which it would take charge itself – which reveals its inability to reconsider its own so far failed experience, and its insistence on cultivating this “nurturing environment" for violence.
