Regardless of whether one approves or disapproves of the methods with which President Mohamed Morsi has been running the country, of the various roles played by his party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and by the Guidance Bureau of the group he is affiliated to, the Muslim Brotherhood, and of the responsibility borne by the President, his party and the group he is affiliated to for the state of affairs reached by Egypt, and regardless of whether one rejects or accepts the notion that the Salvation Front or other opposition forces are “implicated" in providing political “cover" for violence, the way all parties have been dealing with the crisis raises more questions than it provides answers, making it important to understand the way of thinking of “those in power" or “the ruling party", in other words the President, his party and the group he is affiliated to, considering that, although the opposition maintains the ability to stir up the street, those in power hold all the mechanisms providing them with the opportunity to restore calm, but have so far been obstructing rather than making use of them. Do members of the Muslim Brotherhood really all think alike? Do they all see the same scene regardless of the different angles from which each of them is looking at it? Why are their reactions always the same, identical and coordinated, to every event, as if they had all agreed on them, even if they voice them moments after the event occurs? How do they expect Morsi to complete his mandate if the current level of confusion were to be maintained, not to mention increase? Egypt's current situation raises further questions concerning the Muslim Brotherhood: Are they all convinced that the President is always rights and that those who oppose him are almost always wrong? Has none of them noted any comment or mistake with regard to the President's performance – or any reservation with regard to the behavior of the party or of the group it is affiliated to? Are they convinced that Morsi is running the country alone, on the basis of his vision for Egypt, or do they realize that Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and especially members of the Guidance Bureau, have had roles to play in the management of the state? Do they believe that Egypt will overcome this ordeal and survive such strife with the way in which the President has been dealing with the events, problems and catastrophes that have occurred, and with the methods followed by the Muslim Brotherhood in dealing with reality? Does the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Egypt add to the Islamic vision of which the group carried the banner for 80 years, or does it take away from it? And finally: how can the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood expect change in the street and in the political landscape without providing any change themselves, and sufficing themselves with reiterating the same discourse about the mistakes of the opposition, the sins of the Salvation Front and the political cover they provide for violence, without hinting or admitting to any kind of backing down or surrender on the part of the President, his party or the group he is affiliated to? It is noteworthy that some members of the Muslim Brotherhood consider the President to be too lenient, if not weak, in dealing with those who oppose him, and incite him to exercise more strictness and firmness, perhaps even to make use of force, as long as the street remains inflamed. They believe that “arming" the Interior Ministry and giving police officers the right to fire live bullets against those who use Molotov cocktails or flares, those who throw rocks or those who would attack the Heliopolis (Ittihadiya) Palace or state facilities would be sure to resolve the crisis – as if violence itself were the crisis, rather than an outcome of it. There is on the other hand a scenario that would be much simpler, much less costly and much easier to implement, yet it does not seem to even be on the table for the President, his party and the group he is affiliated to. Such a scenario would be based on removing the Prosecutor General and asking the Supreme Judicial Council to appoint one to replace him; forming a commission of legal experts to discuss with political forces the articles that need amending in the constitution; and forming a national salvation government that would address some of the mistakes of the Qandil government, assist the President in the management of the country, supervise the coming parliamentary elections, and dispel fears and suspicions of these elections being rigged in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a utopian scenario, easy to implement but out of the question for the Muslim Brotherhood, on the grounds that it would represent yielding to violence and would be harmful to the prestige of the state, or would affect the President's image. It is as if the violence would come to an end on its own, as if the prestige of the state had not been affected by confused and incoherent decisions, or as if the President's image had not been affected, while his palace has become the target of angry crowds – indeed, it is as if the President's image would remain as it is, as he overcomes a hurdle and brings the country crashing down with him! The Muslim Brotherhood is repeating the experience of the Afghan Jihadists, who cooperated, united, took advantage of the world's support for them in their war against the former Soviet Union, were victorious and expelled the Communists – but then struggled amongst themselves, became divided, failed to manage the state and fought one another. Thus the Taliban movement seized power and the rest is history – culminating in the American invasion of Afghanistan. Will the Muslim Brotherhood reach the same outcome and become Afghanized? Obstinacy does not belong in politics, and maintaining the same methods will drag the country into the flames of civil war. Procrastination, negligence or maneuvers will produce only more violence and a great deal of destruction, and it will not lead to the “Brotherhoodization" of Egypt, but perhaps result instead in the Afghanization of the Brotherhood.
