During his visit to Beirut, Lakhdar Brahimi expressed concerns over the region if the flames of the war in Syria were to expand beyond the country's borders. The UN-Arab envoy, who seemed to be addressing a warning to the neighbors to convey a message to the concerned regional powers, probably wanted to lift his own morale by recalling his mediation which preceded the Taif Accord and the deployment of the Arab deterrence forces that soon turned into purely Syrian forces to end civil war in Lebanon. Brahimi did not come to Beirut to request the deployment of Lebanese deterrence forces on Syrian soil, or even Lebanese observers along the friction lines in Rif Damascus, Homs and Maarat al-Naaman. This is due to the fact that one of the first conditions which any observer should meet is neutrality, while Lebanon – on the official level – will not send its bear to the Syrian vineyard, after Iran summoned its own bear (the Revolutionary Guard in this case) to the country that has lost all immunity vis-à-vis the temptation, threats and prices of custodianship, i.e. Lebanon. At this level, it is no surprise that the Iranian political stronghold fueled the war in Syria and deepened division between the Lebanese in regard to the regime in Damascus and its oppositionists. Now, the situation and the roles are reversed. Brahimi is happy in Beirut with his Lebanese memories, and sad in Damascus over the killing rates. Despite that, his only goal behind the Eid al-Adha truce is the "lowering of the number of people being buried during the holidays," in the hope that this would mark the beginning of a solution. Is this a bad thing? This is what he wondered, at a time when the United Nations is still insisting that the man is avoiding rashness, despite his concerns. In reality, the regional sides or superpowers, in addition to some Security Council members, are all bored of waiting for the initiative which Brahimi will adopt or proclaim to end the massacres which have been ongoing in Syria for 19 months. He perceives the abovementioned truce as being a preliminary test for the wish of both the regime and the opposition to instate a ceasefire. Hence, his step is much less than an initiative, while according to diplomats, it will not push forward the core of the six points that had reached a dead end with the Algerian diplomat's predecessor, i.e. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. What Lakhdar Brahimi does not want is to return to his country after having failed like Annan, and is consequently hoping for a regional-international agreement that would set the foundations for another Lebanese Taif in Syria. And although he does not exclude the emergence of surprises in parallel to his preparation for his initiative, Western states and other countries in the region have come a long way in trading the arming of the Syrian opposition with the unification of its factions and wings that are armed domestically and acting politically abroad. It is clear that the pressures of those supporting the revolution and the opposition are being linked to the urgent wish to contain the Jihadists' expansion on the fighting arenas in Syria, just as it is clear that the patience shown by Brahimi encouraged the states "implicated" in the conflict to engage in a race of initiatives. These initiatives are the kind that extends over a long time, as long as neutrality is missing in the ranks of the two parties involved in the war. Indeed, Moscow cannot claim to be a mediator as long as it is continuing to insist on the stay of the head of the regime, while Tehran - which is waging its war - is not accepted by the opposition. Following the fall of 33,000 dead, Iran is proposing President Bashar al-Assad as the head of a transitional phase, as though the problem resided in the shift carried out by the figures of the regime away from his competent command over the war against "armed groups" or as though the 33,000 dead were "spies for the arrogant powers." As for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is baffled by Brahimi's lingering after he lost his patience due to the revolutionaries' inability to topple the Syrian regime, he is no less concerned about the situation, but at the level of the Turkish role which he had hoped to lead back to the times of the Sultans. He is more aware than anyone else of the fact that the Turkish-Syrian war is prohibited since it will change the direction of the conflict, while the Iranian mine will be awaiting him. Hence his meeting with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his proposal to establish a mutable trilateral mechanism, following the failure of the Egyptian initiative which featured a quartet committee including Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is mutable because Sultan Erdogan has not yet been able to determine the relationship between three trios, i.e. Turkey, Egypt and Iran for one, Turkey, Russia and Iran, as well as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and whether they will work alongside each other or constitute options, one of which will follow up on the Syrian crisis. Certainly, Erdogan is not neglecting the main concerns, thus accusing his opponent - i.e. the Syrian regime - of mobilizing the Kurdistan Workers' Party in order to blackmail him using the card of the Syrian Kurds' self-determination and threaten Turkey's unity. Erdogan's bafflement is mounting, after he thought that the Wali-e Faqih's preoccupation with Iran's problems and the American-European sanctions will unleash the hands of the country of the Sultans and allow it to redraw the political map of the region following the Syrian regime's collapse. For its part, Moscow is probably fueling his puzzlement, as well as that of Brahimi, as it anticipated the Eid truce project in Syria by eliminating the Syrians' hopes in regard to the outcome of his tour.
