It is unlikely to see, in the near future and without the emergence of a major surprise, the eruption of a wide-scale Turkish-Syrian confrontation. Ankara at least does not want such a confrontation for the time being, due to domestic reasons, regional fears and international circumstances. Nonetheless, the regime in Damascus has succeeded – so far at least – in getting the Turkish security issue to go hand in hand with the Syrian internal crisis, thus imposing this crisis on Turkey's agenda and that of its allies. Indeed, the official Syrian leniency with the Kurds opposed to Ankara, namely the Kurdistan Workers' Party, while helping them get a geographic space within Syria, is fueling the Turkish fears over the possible formation of another Kurdish province on the border, as this reality could push the Turkish Kurds to demand a similar province. In the meantime, Turkish security has become part of the discussions inside NATO, as the latter Alliance is finding itself forced to seek the protection of one of its members and its southern flank. These official Syrian attempts to link the domestic conflict to a regional side aim at justifying the obstinate position toward the opposition and its demands on one hand, and at allowing the regime to maintain itself as a necessity in a regional-international axis protecting it against any binding international measures. During the last stage, shells were launched by the Syrian regular troops inside the Jordanian and Lebanese borders. Moreover, clashes erupted with the Free Army on the border with the two countries. Still, the responses did not exceed the point of condemnation on the local levels, and calls for the non-repetition of these acts on the international level. But when it comes to Turkey, the situation is completely different due to its proclaimed position towards the regime, its embracing of sides in the opposition and the Free Army, its international status as a NATO member state and a close ally to the United States, and its regional position on the border with Iran and Russia, both of which are engaged in a tug of war with the West. It is maybe for that exact reason that the Syrian intentional and repeated tensions on the Turkish border are taking another dimension when compared with the situation on the border with Jordan and Lebanon. Hence, the ceiling of the conflict is being raised to a regional and international level as an issue not only affecting security, but also the balance of powers in the region which the Syrian regime is still part of, while receiving support from Iran, its allies and Russia. This renders it a member of a group that needs it, and will support its position in any display of power with Turkey, unlike what is happening with Jordan and Lebanon where the tensions on their border seem to be some sort of harassment which does not serve this group's interests, and is provoking their fear over the possible collapse of the frail domestic balance in both countries. Although the Syrian-Turkish war – which is the result of regional and international calculations – is still unlikely in the near future, the relations between Ankara and Damascus have reached the point of no return. Indeed, the current rivalry has gone from being a mere political standoff between two neighboring states to a social and sectarian divide bringing back to mind history and its numerous tragedies. Consequently, the continuation of each side becomes a denial of the other, and in this case, it would be difficult to imagine any future coexistence between Ankara and Damascus under their current regimes, i.e. the Islamic Sunni one in the first and the Alawite dictatorial one in the second. It thus seems that each of them is wagering on the fall of the other due to the domestic crises, rather than on a war which no one wants until now.
