Kofi Annan acknowledged the failure of his mission in Syria. He gathered his papers and things, and left the screens. He resumed his retirement in the group of Global Elders, which Nelson Mandela founded in 2005, and which also includes in its ranks a veteran expert on beleaguered countries named Lakhdar Brahimi. Annan's fresh statements reflect his anger with three specific parties: President Bashar al-Assad, Russia and China. It was for this reason that he has called on the first to step down, and it is for this reason that he has blamed Moscow and Beijing for the failure of the Security Council to speak with one voice. I do not know what could push a retiree of the stature of Kofi Annan, to end his career with a failure of this kind. Was it that he had delusions about his ability to conjure solutions? Or was it human weakness and the temptation of returning to the limelight, even for a limited period, and to the screens and the capitals of decision? At any rate, he has no right to be surprised by the outcome of his mission. The game was known and all positions were out in the open. Brahimi was closely following Annan's mission. He was aware of the locked doors in Syria, Iran, and Russia, which Annan was unable to acquire the keys to unlock. For neither has the internal conflict matured enough to allow for actual mediation, nor do international relations and the regional duel allow this. Annan's failure to put together a regional and international umbrella weakened his position vis-à-vis both Assad and the opposition, ultimately forcing him to take the decision to return to his retirement. People familiar with Brahimi's methods say that he will not be conducting visits carrying a proposal for a solution consisting of brief points, as his predecessor had done. He will not lay his cards on the table prematurely, and “will not serve food to those who don't think they are hungry yet". In short, Brahimi cannot impose a solution, and will not start out by promoting the features of one. Most probably, he will wager on patience and he will bide his time. Brahimi cannot start mediation efforts in earnest unless both sides of the conflict in Syria feel hunger. Hunger here means the need to find a way out of the crisis. His actual role cannot begin unless both sides realize that victory by the knockout blow is impossible, and that its price is too high. Perhaps Brahimi is wagering on fatigue or despair creeping up unto the hearts and minds of both sides, in the sense that the regime would give up on the possibility of restoring its control over the entire country. This also means realizing that more fighting will compound the risks facing the future of those currently fighting alongside the regime, and that victory is practically out of the question, even if Iranian and Russian support is sustained. Ultimately, this means realizing that a way out must be sought, even if the medicine that needs to be taken as a result is extremely bitter and painful. Perhaps Brahimi is also wagering that the opposition will eventually realize that a knockout blow is impossible in the absence of foreign military intervention, which as of yet is an unattractive prospect for the nations that have the ability to carry it out or are seriously considering it. Or that it will understand that the bloody conflict is taking on an increasingly sectarian nature. Experience tells us that wars among sects may allow warring sides to score points, but never to deal knockout blows that achieve final victory. Instead, this kind of warfare portends the destruction of a nation's unity, long before the other sides can be crushed. It must be also understood that a protracted conflict threatens to turn Syria into a battleground for a regional sectarian war, which is something undesirable to an opposition raising the slogan of a democratic Syria, where the various communities coexist under democracy, freedom and equality. The above leads to a painful conclusion, which is that Brahimi, in order for his mediation efforts to succeed, will need more rivers of blood to flow first, and more waves of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, and more massacres, devastated villages and razed neighborhoods. He needs everyone to despair of a knockout blow, and to feel hunger and the need for a way out from the bloody impasse. He also needs for Vladimir Putin to understand that overplaying his hand in obstructionism threatens to plunge his country in Arab, Islamic and international isolation, and deal immense damage to its image and interests. He requires Iran to realize that is it impossible to protect the advancements it achieved throughout the past decade, and be convinced instead of the need to limit its losses and think about the nature of the compensations it might accept. And finally, he needs regional consultations to succeed, away from the spotlights. I am aware that this is all harsh things to hear for those who lost loved ones and suffered in their livelihoods and dreams. But everything indicates that the killing season will have to escalate, before Brahimi can begin distributing wound dressings and guarantees, and proposals for the realignment of the communities' positions in the new Syria.
