The Islamic revolution in Iran has been hurt, regardless of who ultimately surfaced triumphant in the standoff between the hardliners and the moderates, or reformers, and regardless of the outcome of the conflicts within the radical wing itself. For instance, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad challenged the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, firstly when he chose Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie as his first deputy, without prior consultation with the supreme leader, and secondly, when he refused to reverse his initial decision in this regard. This is despite the fact that Khamenei has been his largest supporter, and had welcomed his victory in the elections, rejecting the accusations made by the opposition and threatening the demonstrators. In all cases, Mashaie withdrew in the end and humiliated the President. Moreover, Khamenei is facing growing opposition from Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his former ally and the one who can fully claim that he was behind Khamenei's ascent to his current position in power. Nonetheless, the supreme leader was in favour of Ahmadinejad in the 2005 elections, where the latter defeated Rafsanjani and won a resounding victory. Khamenei also attacked Rafsanjani, his son and his daughter and still accuses him of corruption, rendering the problem between the two men personal as well as political. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad had persuaded the majority of voters, especially poor and rural people, that he is one of them, and that he will fight corruption. But while he does not possess any mentionable personal fortune, he did surround himself with a group of close allies, and together they shared power, and then he ended up appointing Mashaei: In fact, the latter's only quality is that his daughter is married to Ahmadinejad's son. He has also been under suspicion by many hardliners ever since he stated sometime last year that the Iranians are the friends of all people, including Jews, something that is different from Ahmadinejad's opinion himself. Nevertheless, the Iranian president promoted Mashaei, as a result of the marriage relations between their two families, to the post of First Deputy. Before that, he was one of 12 deputies and was responsible for tourism and culture. In all cases, he was subsequently forced to resign following the public confrontation with the supreme leader. Meanwhile, the moderates are only united in the face of Ahmadinejad, each for their own reasons, and only in supporting Iran's nuclear program. In fact, this last point negates their quality of being moderate in the American and European sense; Mousavi's political record for instance, is far from moderation, in particular when all throughout his election campaign and up until today, he did not say a word about the nuclear program. In any case, the reformist wing will remain united as long as it is facing a common foe (I will not say an enemy), i.e. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As for the hardliners, if they do not agree among themselves and bury the hatchet, the disagreements between them can quickly escalate when the time comes for the formation of the government next month. The situation being as such, there is talk that the President may dismiss 19 ministers, including the ministers of foreign affairs, finance and intelligence. However, he will need to consult the supreme leader so as not to repeat the same crisis of the First Deputy, and logic says that he will indeed do so [consult the supreme leader]. However, he can be careless, and thus might repeat the same mistakes again. In the meantime, the U.S. position seems a bit strange, when the Obama administration is not trying to take advantage of the situation facing the Islamic Revolution. On the contrary, all the statements made by this administration so far underlines its continuing preference for dialogue - which is always a good thing – and its opposition to any new sanctions against Iran. This is while there is no clear and encouraging indication that the regime in Iran, or even the opposition there, will change its declared position in what relates to the continuation of the nuclear program (which Iran insists is peaceful). Furthermore, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy collected everything that has been said in America, Europe and Israel about the subject, and which also comprised all the possible scenarios of when Iran will be able to produce nuclear weapons, from several years ahead, to the possibility that Iran is only six months away from a nuclear weapon. Clearly, however, these analyses reflect the wishes of those who put them forward, rather than reflecting solid information. This is how it came to be that the Americans and the Europeans seem much more moderate that the Israeli inflammatory allegations. In this vein, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appears to have recognized that the Iranian program will continue unabated, up until producing a nuclear weapon. At least, this is how I understood the statements she made during an Asian security conference in Thailand, where she pledged that the United States will extend its defence umbrella to the Gulf States rendering any Iranian nuclear weapons ineffective. Also, we might hear a new stance on the issue in the G20 summit in Pittsburgh next September, which will compliment the positions that will be made during the G8 summit in Italy this month on the Iranian nuclear program. In the meantime, I feel that all that the Americans want from raising concerns in the frontline Arab countries is to sell them more American weapons that have not, and will never be used, and to persuade us that an American defence umbrella is enough, and that possessing nuclear weapons is not in our interests. In fact, it is not in the interest of Israel, and I wish that Arab countries and Iran will possess nuclear weapons to confront Israel. However, my wishes are one thing, and what will really happen is another, and with the challenges facing the Islamic revolution, all I can say is that all scenarios are possible.
