There are diverging positions between the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Hezbollah over the law to grant the Electricite du Liban's contract workers full-time employment. There are also reservations expressed by some FPM officials over the party's behavior while warning against corruption within the resistance. Nonetheless, this is not enough to end the tight alliance between the two. Indeed, the Mar Mekhayel agreement in 2006 was sealed after both the party and the movement realized the extent of the benefits each of them could collect from the relationship with the other, after years of mutual rejection. The benefits were quickly reaped during the July war of that same year, followed by the action led by the two allies to topple the government of Fouad al-Sanioura only a few months after the end of the war. A lot was written to describe the interests which were secured by the alliance and went beyond the Lebanese border, amid openheartedness and even enthusiasm shown by the Iranian and Syrian sponsors. In short, this alliance will not collapse in the near future. However, what happened has shed light once again on the role performed by Hezbollah at the level of Lebanese domestic politics. Many years have gone by – from the mid-nineties – since some Lebanese unionists and leftists believed in the party's ability to establish a missing balance in the battle against the economic-social agenda of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, who was supported by Syria and its Lebanese allies. This belief was prompted by the fact that the party, which was fully dedicated to the fight against the Israeli occupation of the South at the time, and which completely disregarded the allocation of the spoils generated by the country's reconstruction, was inevitably supportive of the classes suffering due to Al-Hariri's neoliberal policies. It was thus said that the party was established to back the weak in the face of the arrogant. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of the Syrian army following Al-Hariri's assassination in 2005 and the political (and national) crisis that followed and is still ongoing until this day, are all factors which contributed to the redefining of the party, its role and tasks. Moreover, upon the end of the July war, numerous questions surfaced in regard to the “jihadist" dimension, which has been limited since that time to the completion of the preparations and the increase of readiness for an upcoming war with Israel, according to the party's literature. Clearly, this dimension has become more closely linked to regional calculations that do not have any regard for the Lebanese factor. On the other hand, another facet of Hezbollah's work emerged, after the latter almost limited all its activities to the Lebanese domestic arena. Indeed, the deepening of the alliance with Michel Aoun and his movement became extremely important among the party's officials, while the mutual justificatory rhetoric escalated between the party and the movement to reach extremely high levels. This situation peaked with the disregarding by Hezbollah – i.e. the carrier of the banner of resistance against Israel - of the case of FPM official Fayez Karam who was convicted of spying for Israel. At the same time, the party was engaged in a fierce “political battle with a sectarian backdrop" (according to Hezbollah's leaders) against the Future Movement led by Saad al-Hariri. In other words, following the retreat of the party's “jihadist" role after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and the shifting of the Iranian priorities, Hezbollah's Lebanonization, which started in 1992 with its participation in the parliamentary elections, was deepened. It consequently became part of the civil divide, i.e. the shape taken by politics in our country. As to its weapons, they are allowing the tilting of the balance in favor of the sectarian group Hezbollah represents, while awaiting the regional timing for their activation. In the meantime, the party believes there is no reason to abstain from mentioning issues such as the workers' rights, equality before the law, the building of the state institutions and the fighting of corruption, while reserving the right to interpret them as it wishes, just like all the remaining armed civil groups among which the party has assumed its advanced position.
