No one expected the negotiations between the 5+1 countries and Iran over the latter's nuclear issue in Moscow to succeed, despite the “progress" announced by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari at the Baghdad negotiations. And what is the scheduling of a meeting soon between technical experts from both sides but an additional indication of the failure of the two rounds of negotiations in Iraq and in Russia? Indeed, the disagreement between the two is not a technical one, and does not revolve around the level of uranium enrichment or the location where such enrichment is taking place. The disagreement is at its core a political-strategic one over Iran's place in the Middle East and its role in managing its crises, as well as its ambition of playing the role of a regional superpower. Just for the sake of comparison, Pakistan's nuclear bomb, and before it that of India, did not stir up any problems with the West, in spite of the danger of Pakistan holding one, in view of the instability of its political situation, and of its presence at the border of Afghanistan, which has a history of enmity towards Europe and the United States. And let us not forget, incidentally, Israel's possession of nuclear weapons with the help and the blessing of said West. A nuclear Iran, as important and dangerous as it may be, or an Iran with traditional armament, represents a “threat" to the West's interests in the Middle East. The regime and its political orientation is the problem for the United States and its allies, who consider it to be a challenge to their old ever-renewed influence and policies. The US Secretary of State, during her meeting with military leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), asserted that “this is (...) a very difficult situation that the world faces right now. (...)We know that a nuclear-armed Iran would be incredibly destabilizing to the region and beyond. (...) but those are not the only concerns. Iran is a state sponsor and exporter of terrorism from Thailand to Mexico, and Iran also is constantly interfering in the internal affairs of a lot of their neighbors". This is the aim of the negotiations, which are coupled with escalation in economic sanctions and threats of resorting to a military solution. Scheduling new dates for negotiations is nothing more than an effort to buy time until circumstances are ripe for striking a comprehensive deal that would address both nuclear and non-nuclear issues. But this will not happen now, as everyone is waiting for the outcome of the events in Syria, and working to ripen said circumstances to their own benefit, by lending support to this or that factor. Iran if the Syrian regime were to fall would not be the same Iran as with this regime present. Its fall would mean weakening Tehran and reducing its influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and the whole region. And its survival would mean strengthening and expanding such influence. The negotiations would then be different; their results, orientation and goals would change, and they would become negotiations over sharing influence and roles. Negotiations over the Iranian nuclear issue are nothing but code for the strategic struggle in the Middle East.
