It is no longer, on the issue of the quarreling factions in the North of Mali, the fact that a large part of the country has seceded from the control of a powerless central government that is arousing concern, but rather the fact that it has moved to the level of religious wars between the fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA – Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad) and those of the Ansar Dine faction, under the banner of applying the rulings of Islamic Sharia law. And it does not seem that the task of West African mediator Blaise Compaore, who yearns to gather the representatives of the Tuareg and the remnants of the central government to put a stop to the fragmentation and division of the country, will be an easy one. This is, on the one hand, because movements with a secessionist orientation have benefited from the situation unleashed by the anarchy that toppled President Amadou Toumani Touré and resulted in major cities in the North of the country falling under the control of the Tuareg, which robbed the central government of any influence on the accelerating course of events. On the other hand, it is because religious conflict deepens contradictions between the constituents of the people of Mali, as religious factions of varying loyalties make use of the language of weapons in the absence of law and stability. The core of the crisis is that it was not born out of the period that followed the collapse of the regime, but was rather part of a set of facts and factors that were inevitable going to erupt at the first juncture. What happened in Mali nearly resembles the situation in Somalia or in any other part of the world that lacks the bases of a viable state with the ability to survive regardless of changes in the form of its regime. Indeed, tribalism or extremist religious tendencies cannot become the alternative to the attributes of coexistence and cohabitation between those party to a unified state governed by civil values, most prominently the sovereignty of the law and the defense of stability. Between East and West Africa, and particularly in regions charged with tension, conflict and ethnic wars, there is a common denominator that meets at the end of the great barrier sought to be erected between the Arab World and its African extensions. It is no coincidence that the map of this balkanization and fragmentation nearly corresponds to the horizontal line between the two worlds: that of Arab countries with African roots and identities in the North, and that of African countries with profound Arab connections in the South. And between the two, volcanoes have been set to erupt, tailored to religious allegiances that have become factors of division much more than of concord. Just as in the tragedy of Sudan, which resulted in two quarreling states being established that are difficult to lead to the shores of peaceful coexistence, half of the recipe is today being tried in Mali. And tomorrow, Nigeria, Chad or Niger may not be spared from the repercussions of the plans of division being brought down from old shelves. In the past, the architects of breaking down the Dark Continent would resort to drawing border with rulers that gave no weight to the distribution of tribes, rivers or resources. They would do this with the aim of planting the seeds of division, balkanization and rupture, every time signs of a crisis would loom on the horizon. They are perhaps today looking with relief at the harvest season of crises of border delineation. Indeed, there are in African continent dozens of conflicts that wane then reemerge, on a background of ethnic, geographic and even religious distribution. Over four decades ago, the Arab World took notice of the fact that the source of its strength lied in opening up to Africa and to Asia, and in garnering the support of what is known as the Third World for its fateful causes. This pioneering experience led to the formation of the greatest power under the banner of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which championed moderate religious affiliation. At the time, the League of Arab States had followed its example and shaped the features of an Arab-African dialogue that was noteworthy. Indeed, the matter had been closer to an overwhelming current of liberation equivalent to the momentum carried by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with perspectives of principle and independence. Where are we now of such momentum? The Arab World has withdrawn into itself, and there are no longer many Africans who would find any embarrassment in claiming that some Arab parties had moved their conflicts to the African scene. Yet more dangerous is the fact that those exporting problems and crises are not states, but rather extremist religious groups the likes of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and similar extremist organizations that have exploited the vacuum left by gracious initiatives. In the Mali crisis in particular, it was clear that the hypotheses that were reinforced by facts could only lead to results identical to the anarchy overwhelming the Sub-Saharan coastal region, with it having turned into fertile ground for the proliferation of lawless and uncontrolled armed movements. Numerous voices were raised, warning of the dangers, but they have waned as a result of the preoccupation with preventing Arab and Islamic expansion towards the Dark Continent. The President of Burkina Faso is trying his luck at a lonely mediation to patch things up. No Arab president has done this, despite the fact that the crisis is taking place near some of the most densely populated Arab countries, within range of the anarchy. And in the near future, the failure of the West African mediation could become a pretext for Western intervention. And certainly the West will not do this just for the sake of those yearning for the blessing of stability, even on the background of the dangerous spread of flammable maps and the trend towards putting them out through decisions issued from the opposite shore of the Mediterranean or from across the Atlantic.
