Has the rise of Iran in the region reached its peak and begun the phase of descent and regression? Let us take a look at the facts: throughout the past years, the Iranians have accused foreign powers of targeting their revolution, conspiring against it and constantly seeking to overthrow it. They have continued to build on this assumption to justify their interference in the affairs of their neighborhood, near and far. They said that the US invasion of Iraq threatened their security and their borders, so they sent weapons, fighters, suicide bombers and booby trap experts. They claimed that the Arabs were hostile to them and sought to isolate them, so they incited minorities and factions – funding and arming them to stir instability and impose policies. They spread the rumor that Israel was waiting for the opportunity to attack them, so they fired their rockets at it from South Lebanon and Gaza… Then they “discovered” – and the world discovered with them – that the problem was an internal one, in the heart of their homeland, and even if they for long succeeded in concealing it, it has risen to the surface and it is no longer possible to camouflage it or cover it with deception. Tehran has shown, with the result of the presidential elections, that it is unable to adapt to changes taking place around it, and that it is incapable of comprehending and seizing the available opportunity of the hand stretched out by the US. The Americans, whose relationship with the rest of the world had witnessed tremendous decline over the past eight years, and who were then stricken by a financial and economic crisis, were able to change and brought a different president to lead the process of restoring balance both internally and at the foreign level. As for the Iranians, they have shown a rigidity that is illogical and chosen to continue down the same path, deciding to renew Ahmadinejad's term, which was marked by threats in every direction and challenging the world in the enrichment issue, at the foreign level, and by reinforcing the role of security forces and the Revolutionary Guard internally. This is the difference between democracies and oppressive regimes. Indeed, the former hold within themselves mechanisms of evolution, change of directions and flexible choices, whereas the latter are stricken with panic at any change, as they fear being swept away, and find no way to confront it other than further stringency. Even the “assets” that Tehran employed in expanding outwards seem to have themselves exhausted their role and their spark after providing as much as they could in terms of “services”, and have shown, like their authority of reference, their inability to renew themselves – entering into a state of marking time that will certainly lead to a decline in their importance and function as the new US perspectives take shape. Indeed, in Iraq, the state has begun to gradually regain its sovereignty, especially after the withdrawal of US troops from the cities. The Arab world has also become more accepting of the current regime – despite some remarks regarding the necessity of widening participation and ensuring rights – and the Iraqis proved that they have grown more mature when the latest series of bombings failed to bring back sectarian strife. In other words, Iran's ability to set its allies in motion and to exploit contradictions has begun to wane, and it will not be long until the Iraqis can set reasonable limits to it. In Lebanon, Iran's ally has suffered a long-term political setback, and the results of the parliamentary elections have shown that Hezbollah's popularity has become restricted to the Shiite sect alone and some alliance imposed from abroad. The “Iranian model” is no longer appealing or able to attract. The Southern front is no longer open, and the party is unable to activate it whenever it wishes, because the results could prove disastrous for both itself and Lebanon. The elections have set a limit to its ability to threaten the internal situation, because this would threaten to turn into a broad sectarian war. Meanwhile, Damascus endeavors to prove its good intentions and its commitment to its pledges, and to obtain certificates of appreciation from the West. As for Gaza, well, it is still besieged and suffering from its wounds. The Hamas movement is barely able to manage the Gaza Strip in terms of livelihood and security, and has neither the ability nor the audacity to wage a new conflict that would add to the suffering of its people. The rockets that are being fired from time to time have only the role of reminding that there is a party there that must be taken into consideration and with whom dialogue must be engaged in. However, the political weight of the Palestinians is held by the legitimate leadership whom the world addresses. Iran has skillfully used these assets throughout the past period and it has taken its impetus to its full extent. Yet its supposed adversaries have evolved, changed and succeeded in launching the process of containing it. As for Iran itself, it is still the prisoner of the same mode of thought and the same approach to itself and to the world, which makes a solution to its internal and external crisis difficult to imagine without changing the present formula, even if by force.
