The two leaders, Kaka Massoud (Barzani) and Mam Jalal (Talabani), do not disagree over the goal of seceding from Iraq and declaring the independence of the Kurdish state. But they do disagree over the timing and over dividing Northern Iraq. Barzani considers that the situation in the Middle East is suitable for escalation in the face of the government in Baghdad. He threatened once from Washington, several times from Erbil, and escalated his threat from Turkey after meeting with Erdoğan and Davutoğlu. He escalated in the face of Baghdad, after his gift to Ankara of a stance it has for decades been waiting for, in which he advised the fighters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), who occupy positions in the mountains of the autonomous province, to put a stop to their military operations and turn to dialogue with the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). Kaka replied to his partner Mam Jalal, who does not consider the timing to be appropriate for declaring the independence of the state, saying: “I am willing to spill my blood for independence, but I am not willing to spill it for autonomy”. There are in Iraqi political circles two opinions concerning Kurdistan province: the first considers that Baghdad should make a bold move and give the Kurds complete independence, while keeping Kirkuk, in order to shed this heavy historical burden; the second clings to the federal formula because regional circumstances do not allow this at the moment – i.e. because timing, once again, is the most important factor. In other words, the Arabs, with their sects, and the Kurds, with their tribes, see no possibility of maintaining the formula of the one state, whether federal or centralized, and are waiting for the right circumstances for secession. The regional and international circumstances the two sides are waiting for mean the development of the situation in the province, exposed to having its maps redrawn more than at any time before. Kaka Massoud considers the situation to be suitable now. Syria is overwhelmed by its political and security crisis, the Arabs will not support it if it tries to confront the step he seeks to take, and Syria's Kurds are prepared to bear arms, as they in fact already have, like all other Syrians. Iran is surrounded, regionally and internationally, and any military action it might take inside Iraq could ignite a regional war. As for the AKP's Turkey, it could recognize his state in exchange for abandoning the PKK, helping Turkey quell the rebellion in Anatolia, and giving the Turkmen of Kirkuk “their right to power and oil”. Such simplification of a complex reality, in Iraq and in the region, takes as its background sectarian division. Kaka belongs to the majority supported by Turkey in the province (Erdoğan has declared this several times), especially after the disagreement between Ankara and Tehran over the Syrian issue, and competition between the two capitals over leadership of the Middle East, i.e. influence in Arab countries. Yet the bigger question that has been on the table ever since Barzani's father declared the creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in the 1930s, suffered failure and fled to Moscow, which had been by his side, supporting a friend in its confrontation back then with Turkey and Iran: Would Turkey really stand by his side if he declares the independence of his state? Would it take such a risk? Would religious orientation, which gives no importance to national identity or national borders, prevail, or would Turkish nationalists rebel against Erdoğan? Moreover, would Iran remain silent if it becomes completely surrounded, through the collaboration of the Kurds and the United States? And before all of this, have the Kurds agreed among themselves over declaring independence, when they have not yet reached an agreement over sharing power and wealth within the province? Those questions and others have not been answered by Kaka Massoud. This is why Maliki does not take his threats seriously. And until he answers them, Baghdad will remain in the position of a negotiator who holds many cards.
