The decision by Iran and the six countries concerned with its nuclear issue to move their negotiations to Baghdad represents strong support for Nouri Al-Maliki's government, which is engaged in an internal struggle against forces that oppose Tehran and the political direction it is taking in the region. Indeed, such a decision suggests that the two sides have agreed over Iraq returning to play the role of a stable and capable state, amid the chaos that has stricken the Middle East. In fact, Iran went further than this, when it expressed its readiness for a “quick” settlement, and Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council for the Regime Mohsen Rezaee asserted that Baghdad would be playing a significant role in this settlement during negotiations. He said “Given the fact that our friends in Turkey have failed to fulfill some of our agreements, the talks… had better be held in another friendly country”. The fact is that US-Iranian agreement over holding negotiations in Baghdad does not mean that they will be easy or that the settlement will take place thanks to the Iraqis (if it even does take place), but rather that both sides have an interest in supporting the Iraqi regime. The United States wants to make sure that its war was not in vain, and that it has turned Iraq into a country that carries weight in international and regional politics, while Iran wants international recognition of its role in this Arab country that represents a model for its interests meeting with those of the West, or for sharing influence in the region. As for Iraqi officials, and most prominently Maliki, they see in holding these negotiations support for them in the face of their domestic rivals. This is what they asserted when they announced Iraq's return to its neighborhood, after the Arab Summit, and after long decades of wars, sanctions, isolation and dropping out of the regional balance of power. Their statements were very optimistic, and in fact exaggerated to the point of being humorous, despite their awareness of the fact that Baghdad's return to its Arab neighborhood is nearly impossible now, because the political direction it has taken does not agree with those of such a neighborhood. Indeed, what is required of Maliki is to confront Iranian influence in his country, as well as to close its markets to Syrian goods. He is also required not to turn Iraq into part of a regional coalition opposed by its neighbors. Clearly Baghdad cannot, and its government does not want to, leave such a coalition. This is why it has been excluded from any talks or plans regarding Bahrain, Yemen, the UAE or Syria, and why the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has invited Morocco and Jordan to join it, knowing that Iraq is more entitled to this by virtue of its location on the Gulf. The Gulf Arabs are very doubtful of Maliki's stances, and they consider Iraq, with its current policy, to represent a bridge connecting the coalition that opposes all of their policies, in addition to obstructing the plans of Turkey and of the countries overrun by the Arab Spring. The Gulf Arabs also consider that Maliki's efforts to consecrate such a state of affairs signify consecrating the “crescent” which the Jordanian monarch had warned of. This also signifies a geostrategic breach which the United States, Turkey and the Shah's Iran confronted during the past century's Cold War, and which they are confronting today with the countries of the GCC. Meanwhile, Moscow views it as a golden opportunity for its return to the international arena at the start of the new Cold War. What is required of Maliki for Iraq to return to its neighborhood is the same thing required of the Syrian regime: distancing himself from Iran, even if negotiations have been held over the latter's nuclear issue in Baghdad in agreement with Washington. And all available indications certify that Iraq's neighbors, except for Iran and Syria naturally, will not stand idly by if Maliki persists in this policy.
