Whom should we believe? The Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem, or the Ministry's spokesman Jihad Makdessi? Which one of them is conveying the official position of the Syrian regime? Yesterday, the minister announced from Moscow that the government had indeed pulled out its troops from some cities, based on the plan of international-Arab Envoy Kofi Annan, which meant that Damascus approved that plan and was committed to its implementation. However, ministry's spokesman had stated a few days ago that Damascus would only accept the plan after receiving written guarantees from the opposition and Arab states, which meant that Damascus did not quite approve Annan's plan. What was stated by Al-Muallem in Moscow therefore belies what Al-Makdessi has stated. There has been an increase of operations targeting Syrians, with heavy artillery and tanks, and the storming of towns and cities in tandem with the escalation of killings and massacres perpetrated by governmental forces. This is claiming the lives of more than one hundred people per day, including yesterday - i.e. the day on which military vehicles should have been pulled out and the ceasefire imposed. This all belies what was said by Al-Muallem. But in any case, the roles of Al-Muallem and Al-Makdessi are complementary in defending the continuation of the militaristic solution and the killing. The first is doing so by using a diplomatic rhetoric aimed at alleviating Russian discontent, which was clear yesterday in Minister Sergei Lavrov's statements and his call upon the government in Damascus to adopt more stringent measures toward the implementation of Annan's plan. He is also making (false) promises to avoid any Russian bias in favor of a Security Council resolution imposing the implementation of the plan, after Moscow had supported the presidential statement. The second, on the other hand, is using a blatant rhetoric conveying the actual rejection of the plan by way of imposing conditions (“written guarantees”) from others, bearing in mind that these conditions cannot be met for numerous reasons. Therefore – according to Damascus – the other side is the one obstructing the implementation of the plan, which justifies the continuation of the killing. At this level, it is noted that on the eve of Al-Muallem's visit to Moscow, two developments on the ground with great political significance occurred. The first was the shooting from the Syrian territories across the Turkish border, and the second was the shooting across the Lebanese border, with the two incidents inflicting casualties in both neighboring states. The two incidents suggest that the Syrian regime wishes to heat up the situation on the border with Turkey and Lebanon, both of which are being accused by Syria of being among the sources of the armaments reaching the “terrorist groups.” These acts thus aim at transferring the debate from one surrounding Damascus' implementation of the six points featured in Annan's plan, to the discussion of the threats affecting Syria from across the border, and consequently the necessity of deterring these threats and defending Syrian sovereignty. Indeed, did the official Syrian news agency not confirm that “armed groups” were the ones that killed the Lebanese cameraman, at a time when eyewitnesses said that the shots were fired by the Syrian army? Moreover, did that same agency not claim that these same “armed groups” came in from Turkey and that government troops were deterring them, at a time when human rights groups confirmed that those who were targeted by the Syrian troops were civilians who had fled the heavy bombing of their homes? The two incidents might thus have the aim of providing an additional excuse for Al-Muallem during his talks in Moscow, in order to justify the exaggeration of the threat coming from across the border. It is therefore expected to see the repetition of such intentional incidents, their widening and their claiming of additional lives, in order to provoke a response, particularly from Turkey. This would preempt the possible creation of buffer zones or humanitarian corridors, especially once the international community becomes aware of the fact that the Syrian regime will not implement Annan's plan, and that the fabrications and stalling are still impacting the Russian opposition of any binding international resolution vis-à-vis Damascus.
