Political Islam in Turkey has its own spring, stretching from 1974, when the late founder of the Islamist movement Necmettin Erbakan became Deputy Prime Minister in Bülent Ecevit's government, to the times of his disciples, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It is a spring that has been characterized by conflict with the military institution, the guardian of secularism. The real conflict with Erbakan began when he was Ecevit's Deputy Prime Minister in 1980, the date of the infamous military coup that toppled him and his government and banned his party. Yet the “Teacher” (Hodja) did not despair, and founded the Welfare (Refah) Party, which was banned as well, then the Virtue (Fazilet) Party and the Felicity (Saadet) Party, the fate of which was no better than that of the previous two. The man was sentenced to jail, accused of embezzling millions of dollars and forbidden from practicing politics. Through a legal loophole, some who had split off from his party established the Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma) Party (AKP), which now governs Turkey with its well known leaders (Gül, Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu). The Turkish Spring lived on with this trio, who waged and are still waging a struggle against the military institution, and who managed to amend the constitution through a popular referendum to make it possible to prosecute members of the military, especially those responsible for the coup, who had amended it in 1983, which allowed for prosecuting them now. Prosecution of the leaders of the coup began in 2000, foremost among them being General Kenan Evren, known for tormenting Islamists and Leftists, as if it were revenge for the “Teacher” Erbakan and his companions who suffered at the hands of the military institution. Indeed, the General is ninety-four years old, and no longer enjoys any influence, neither in the street nor in politics. Alternatively, the prosecution could be aimed at a past historical period, and represent a warning to the army's leadership, its generals and its institutions. But how did Erdoğan manage to be victorious in confronting the military? Before Evren's trial, which began last week, the government accused the Commander of the Military Academy, General Bilgin Balanlı, of planning a coup in 2003 with 200 army officers, in what became known as the “sledgehammer operation”. He was thrown in jail, and his companions were suspended. And when army leaders complained to Erdoğan and threatened to resign, believing that the Prime Minister would not accept this so as not to create a vacuum in the leadership, he surprised them by accepting their resignations. Greater still was their surprise when on the next day the Commander of the Gendarmerie was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Erdoğan had been preparing for this ever since he came to power. He had strengthened the Gendarmerie and Security forces and provided them with heavy artillery, under the pretext of confronting unrest, especially in Kurdish areas, and this apparatus had become a parallel army loyal to the government of the Justice and Development Party, its leadership including known Islamists. In this way, Turkey's Islamists were able to consolidate their power. On the basis of Erbakan's teachings, they opened up to their neighborhood, especially their Arab neighborhood, the spring of which began in Tunisia with the Ennahda (Renaissance) Party, stretching to Libya with its Islamists and then to Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood. But Syria's “spring” was confronted by the regime, and it was imperative for Ankara to support its “brethren” and abandon its friendship with Damascus, so that the “spring” may be completed in its neighborhood and so that it may spread its model of government.
