The horrific scenes coming from Syria should not obscure one's vision. Condemnation and denunciation should not disrupt one's ability to analyze. Let us assume that a journalist conducted over a week contacts with officials in the neighboring countries of the Syrian fire, along with dialogues with figures concerned with the crisis, across the board. Such an endeavor helps one to conduct an extensive assessment of the results of the first year of the bloody crisis in Syria. - The Syrian crisis is deep, complex and complicated. It is in part one of the stops of the Arab Spring, i.e. the uprisings against the monopoly by one party of power, guarded by a firm security grip. In another aspect of it, it is a battle over Syria's position in the region, where there are those who deal with Syria as an advanced episode of an Iranian decade-old offensive. And in its third facet, it is a crisis of an international tug-of-war through which Russia is attempting to restore its position in the region, and to intercept the advance of the Islamist Spring towards the Russian neighborhood. - The crisis has inflicted severe damage and harm on the Syrian regime. Before the eruption, Syria was a prominent regional player that leaned against strict stability at home and cards that the regime possessed beyond its borders. Today, Syria is a playground for a bitter internal conflict and proxy wars on its soil. Its seat at the Arab League is vacant. The prestige of its security services has been perforated. And its ability to restore strict stability is in much doubt. - The Syrian regime has squandered an opportunity that was available to it in the two weeks that followed the Deraa spark. If it had only taken the initiative to drop Article Eight and rushed to form a national unity government led by an acceptable figure from outside the ruling party, while reining in the security services, the protests would not have shifted from calling for reforming the regime to calling for its downfall. - Were it not for the Russian life preserver, and not the Iranian one, the regime would have sunk into a stifling isolation. Moscow's stance is based on strategic calculations. Russia wants to retain its toehold. It risked antagonizing the Arab-Western camp, but it holds the key to the solution or the mandatory passageway to it. But this does not mean at all that the calculations of both Moscow and Damascus are identical in the next phase. Furthermore, the regime, which had for long collected many proceeds from its alliance with Iran, is now paying the price for this same alliance. - The regime has underestimated the changes brought by the Arab Spring in a number of countries and in the attitudes of the people. It also underestimated the repercussions of the Sunni - Shiite tension in the region. - The regime succeeded in preventing the establishment of a Syrian equivalent of Benghazi and foreclosed any million-strong protests, but its heavy-handed approach in dealing with the protests made it lose its battle on television screens the battle for the Arab, Islamic and Western public opinion. - The regime has succeeded in convincing countries, groups and minorities that uprooting it through an international intervention risks turning Syria into another Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia, i.e. bloody chaos in the heart of the Arab world and on the borders with Israel. - The regime has managed to retain a degree of popular support that has rallied around a very cohesive military and security machine, despite the defections that have yet to affect its core. - The regime has demonstrated its ability to deal devastating blows to cities, neighborhoods and regions, but it did not succeed in putting down protests and offering a reasonable program to end the crisis. An end to the crisis is in fact conditional upon the redistribution of power and decision-making. There are those who see the need for a ‘SyrianTaif Accord' akin to the Lebanese one, in terms of distributing control of security, foreign policy, economy and administration, to avoid the partition of the state and the country. - Over one year, the opposition did not succeed in overthrowing the regime, yet the regime did not succeed either in ending its determination to protest amid the rubble. The opposition succeeded in securing broad Arab and international support, but the absence of any desire to intervene militarily has drawn strict limits for the role of external parties and neighboring countries, especially Turkey. The opposition has demonstrated an ability to fight a protracted and costly war of attrition against the regime, but it has failed to produce a coherent framework and a unified vision that would reassure those who are concerned, both at home and abroad. On the other hand, the regime has shown an ability to fight a long battle despite international pressures and accelerated economic deterioration. Perhaps this assessment will help explain the five-point agreement between Sergei Lavrov and Arab foreign ministers. And perhaps it will help us understand the balance of power that must no doubt be affecting the efforts of Kofi Annan. An opposition that is so far incapable of overthrowing the regime, and a regime that is so far incapable of eliminating the opposition. It is difficult for the regime to retreat after what it did, and the same applies to the opposition. It is then an internal crisis, a tough regional test and an international tug-of-war. This is the image we see on the eve of the first anniversary of the eruption of the bloody crisis, which is markedly different from the previous battles of the Arab Spring.
