The double veto in the Security Council has unchained imaginations and all kinds of interpretations. It is no exaggeration to say that the session was extraordinary. The crisis in Syria is extremely heated and the Council convened amid news of a horrific massacre in Homs. International polarization regarding the crisis then escalated, while Western nations stepped up their presence at the beginning of the new round at the Security Council. The veto thwarted the Arab-Western draft resolution. Some believe that Russia wanted to use the Syrian crisis to spark a major crisis in international relations. Russia wanted to signal to the United States that its hands are not free in the Middle East and the Security Council, and that it cannot rely on international bodies to undermine a regime and continue redrawing the features of a region. Russia cannot compromise on the fate of the last foothold it has in the Middle East, particularly one along the frontlines of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Others believe that China, in turn, wanted to tell the United States to curb its enthusiasm and consider the interests of other parties. To consider that China deals with the Syrian crisis with an eye on Iran, its interests there and its Iranian oil imports. And to consider that China thinks of the coming decades, and the risk of the oil lake in the Middle East falling entirely in the hands of the United States, which would curtail the ascent of the Chinese giant. Some think that the current Russian-American crisis is akin to major crises such as the Cuban missile crisis in the early sixties. Those voices recalled that the Cuban crisis ended with the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, in return for the Americans pledging not to intervene militarily to overthrow Fidel Castro. But the truth is that the Cuban crisis was a different matter, given its location and even its severity, while a half century separates the two crises. Moscow today is Russian not Soviet, and the Cold War took place amid a different balance of power. There are those who noticed another issue: The Americans were not oblivious to the fact that the Russian side would resort to the veto. Rather, the Russians were deliberately pushed to this position, which puts Russia at odds with a broad coalition representing the majority. Moscow was practically forced to stand against the will of the Arab League, and appeared hostile to the Arab spring as it spawned Islamists whenever a regime fell and the ballot boxes were opened. Therefore, Moscow will no doubt pay a price for its antagonism to the Arab-Western project. Since the moment the votes were cast, Western and Arab voices rose to blame Russia for any Syrian descent into open civil war, a position also echoed by several international organizations. It is clear that Russia wants to be the sponsor of a solution or the key to one, and that it is keen on a formula that preserves the regime, with the introduction of some reforms. Such a formula would preclude the collapse of institutions, especially the army and what it means for the composition of the country. The survival of institutions would allow Russia to retain some of its interests and its role, especially if it manages to obtain exclusive sponsorship rights for a dialogue or the transitional period. On the other hand, Syria can speak of the loyalty of its Russian ally, and maintain that Moscow would not allow a resolution at the Security Council that calls for President Bashar al-Assad to step down or sanction military intervention – which is not on the table at present-, or even impose total international isolation against the regime. However, Syria realizes at the same time that its international position now hinges upon the Russian lifeline, and such a position no doubt has a price that Syria must pay. Russia has many interests in Syria, yet it has a long list of problems, demands, issues and interests with the West as well. It is in this context that the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the head of foreign intelligence services Mikhail Fradkov to Damascus tomorrow can be seen as extremely important. We will have to wait to see what Lavrov will ask of Assad. Most likely, Moscow will call for initiatives that would push the process of finding a solution forward, thus enabling the two countries to avert regional and international isolation. Moscow will ask a price for its position in New York. In the end, the path to the solution must no doubt resemble the proposal of the Arab League, with some amendments. But the crucial question here involves Lavrov's briefcase. What demands will he carry to Damascus and what answers will he carry back? Damascus cannot deal with Lavrov's briefcase in the manner with which it had dealt with Nabil el-Araby's.
