There is a bitter battle taking place on Syria's soil. The page has been turned on the comprehensive and firm stability. The daily developments in Syria are heartbreaking, and the terrible images coming from Syria carry with them the threat of worse things to come: Funerals and shouts, bullets and protests, then funerals. Then come banners and pleads, followed again by funerals. And between one procession and the other, the Arab may ask this about Syria; what remains of its stability, unity, and harmony among its communities? What about its ability to flee its bloodshed? What is happening in Syria goes beyond the issue of the fate of the regime there. Rather, it involves regional and international roles, and balances that were once thought to be solid. It involves the fate of long-term political, military and security investments. For this reason, we have seen the crisis spread from the streets of Homs to the Security Council, from the streets of Idlib to the Kremlin, and from the squares of Hama to the office of Iran's Supreme Leader. Let us leave aside the ferocity of everyday scenes, the excessive use of force, the brutal practices and the stench of civil war. Syria has been drawn into a major battle, the battle of the limits of the roles. And the most sinister thing about it is that the belligerents all feel that defeat is not an option. Before the battle for the bomb, Iran fought a battle for the role. It made strides in the region, and perhaps it sought after the bomb to protect this role and as a permanent insurance policy for its regime. Most probably, the officials in Iran did not anticipate that a battle will erupt in Syria, even after the advent of the Arab spring. That Iran stood by Syria's side is nothing odd or surprising. It is enough to remember that Syria had protected Iran from a full Arab siege against it during its war with Iraq, and that the relationship with Syria has allowed Iran to be stationed along the lines of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, enabling it to hold the card of threatening the security of Israel through Hezbollah's rockets. Iran would not have had the ability to disrupt the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts, were it not for the Syrian crossing. If Iran loses Syria, this will mean a resounding defeat for a decades-old policy. It will effectively push Iran into the Iraqi theater, which is burning today. And it is no secret that Sunni Arabs there refuse what they call “Iranian domination”. That Hezbollah stood by Syria's side is nothing odd or surprising either. Losing the Syrian crossing would mean for the Lebanese group losing its strategic depth, and a political and military lifeline. This would render the Party of God once again a local player, years after it became a prominent regional player. Without the Syrian depth, it will be difficult for the Party to wage a new war against Israel. It would lose a large part of what it calls its deterrent or the balance of terror. Russia, too, cannot simply accept losing its position in Syria. The issue involves more than the Russian naval base on the Mediterranean. The presence in Syria is a presence in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a presence close to Israel. Without presence in Syria, Russia is relegated to being a faraway country. In addition, the Russian generals recall for sure that their country's weapons were defeated in Iraq and then in Libya. Through Syria, Russia crosses to the heart of the region. Its presence there gives Russia some measure of relevance and defiance. Through Syria, Hezbollah crosses into Iraq and Iran. And through Syria, Iran crosses to the shores of the Mediterranean. The need for the Syrian crossing gives Damascus allies in the ongoing battle. But at the same time, it places it in the midst of a regional and international tug of war on its soil, a tug to which it has no keys that can determine its course and its fate. It is not easy to talk about a deal that assigns gains, losses, safeguards and conciliatory measures. To date, we can say that the possibility of Syria drowning in the crisis exceeds that of overcoming it. This applies to the both the regional and international duel, and the internal battle as well. It is a major battle that is more than Syria can bear. A battle of such internal ferocity, and the regional and international polarization, may well lead to Syria imploding and sinking in a protracted civil war.
