The Syrian opposition considers the regime agreeing to the Arab League's initiative to represent a victory for it. Indeed, after the regime had rejected any foreign interference, Arab or otherwise, here it is agreeing to all the clauses it had voiced reservations over when they were put forward the first time in Cairo. It pledged to stop the violence, to allow the media to enter and work freely in different cities and villages, and to sit down to the negotiation table with those it considers to be saboteurs and foreign agents. Moreover, it does not object to the meetings taking place at Arab League headquarters, after it had considered this to disparage the sovereignty of the state, and insisted on holding any dialogue in Damascus. This simplistic interpretation of the regime's stance has driven the opposition abroad (the National Council) to take a stance rejecting the initiative, to escalate and insist on suspending Damascus's membership in the Arab League. And if it is inevitable for there to be dialogue, it should take place on the basis of setting a mechanism for handing power over to “the people's true representatives”. It also asked the Arab League to provide cover for international intervention “to save the civilians”. In other words, the reaction from the opposition abroad came based on the experience of Libya, without taking into consideration the complexities of the situation in its own country, the nature of the regime it wants to see leave, or the danger of a civil war, the instruments of which have become available both inside and outside of Syria: internally, where sectarian and confessional slogans prevail and weapons spread, and abroad, where neighboring countries, foreign intelligence services and international organizations are preparing to contribute to igniting it. Beyond this, the opposition hastily concluding that the regime is backing down, and considering it a victory, has not taken into consideration its own situation and divisions. Indeed, in addition to the National Council which was formed in Istanbul and represents the opposition abroad, there are the “coordination committees”, the Popular Front for Change and Liberation, Baath defectors, Nasserists, Communists, Nationalists, etc… And every party has its own program. Some of them favor dialogue, others are against any contact with the regime, and others still have participated in the commission to draft a new constitution for the country. Doubtless the regime will exploit such division to the utmost extent, so as to impose its own conditions on any party it engages in dialogue with. Indeed, it is not true that the National Council speaks in the name of all of the opposition, and it is not true that the coordination committees have managed to coordinate between the different factions. Facing such fragmentation within the ranks of the opposition, the regime remains cohesive, and talk of defections within the ranks of the army is little more than provocation. Indeed, the military institution is so far still gathered around its political leadership. As for Riad Asaad and his “Free Syrian Army” in Turkey, and his statements about issuing orders to “his fighters” to halt operations in order to give the Arab League's initiative a chance, they represent yet another pretext to assert the opposition's links to foreign plots, as the leaders of the regime keep repeating. This aside, the opposition is wagering on a change in international stances, after the Chinese and Russian veto brought down the American-European draft resolution at the Security Council. It says that Beijing and Moscow were against interfering in Libya but quickly joined behind the international community in order to preserve their interests. It thus once again makes the mistake of misestimating the difference between the two countries, the structural makeup of their societies and the geopolitical environment of each of them. Of course, this does not mean that the regime is right, but it knows how to use its domestic cards and its foreign relations. It is retreating there so as to advance on the field, and that is what is driving it to cling to its stances. It would have been better for those who reject the Arab League's initiative not to fall prisoner to their own slogans. They should have accepted it and prepared for dialogue with a unified work program. Indeed, its clauses meet some of their demands; while their rejection of it will only increase the opposition's fragmentation, and will make the regime exploit this to its benefit both domestically and abroad. Between the first Friday at the beginning of the uprising over seven months ago, and the “Allahu Akbar Friday” yesterday, thousands of Syrians were killed (the United Nations estimates their number at three thousands), trust has been completely lost between all parties, sectarian and confessional polarization is no longer a secret to anyone, and the peaceful “revolution” has become armed. It is thus feared that the country will turn into an arena instead of a homeland. It seems that the Syrians, both in the opposition and in the regime, have not learned from the experiences of Lebanon and Iraq, and here they are, repeating their mistakes and the mistakes of others.
