In the manner of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), Tunisia's Islamists in the Renaissance Movement (Nahda) have achieved a clear victory through the primary means of democracy: elections. Copying the model established by Erdoğan and his companions, Tunisia's new leader Rashed Ghannouchi asserted his commitment to establishing a state that “brings Islamic values and modern democratic values together”. Ghannouchi had recently stated that Turkey “represents not just a model for Tunisians, but for all Arabs, given that it has greatly focused on economic development, combated corruption in the public sector, ensured the independence of the judiciary, and brought the army under control, in addition to having never stood against the will and the aspirations of its people – as those are characteristics that make of Turkey a fine example for the Tunisian people and the Arabs to follow”. This first success in the Arab World of Turkey's Islamist model, which the West encourages and praises for its own reasons, despite the fact that it is still much too early to judge, may drive other Arab peoples, Egypt being the most likely candidate, to seek to follow the same example. Yet it at the same time arouses the fears of other parties in the region, who see the danger that lies in the simplistic promotion of the virtues of Islamist regimes of rule. Indeed, Ghannouchi, who has benefited from popular sympathy that represents compensation to his party for the campaign of harassment and exile waged against it by Ben Ali's regime, is ignoring the fact that Turkey, which has not been able to find a solution to the problem of minorities and is still waging an escalating war against the Kurds on its own soil and inside Iraq, is subject to its own set of circumstances and factors that do not necessarily apply to others – in particular as a result of its proximity to Europe and its being forced to accommodate the European Union with a great deal of laws and regulations in its desire to obtain membership, an issue that is not on the table for any Arab country. As for what Turkey is witnessing today in terms of joining together Islam and secularism, it is the result of a century of the legacy of Atatürk, a legacy that is difficult to overcome and one which the Islamists did not willingly choose. This appears in their constant tug of war with the military institution and their tendency to place restrictions on the press. There are also some who believe that the Turkish Islamists practice a kind of opportunism in politics that has rarely been seen, and change their stances with an ease that calls for shedding doubt on the soundness of relying on them. This is what recently happened with Iran, with which they strongly disagreed on the issue of the situation in Syria and that of the NATO missile shield until the matter reached the extent of mutually exchanged threats. Then all of this suddenly calmed down and faded away, after Ankara found it in its interest to jointly confront with Tehran the fighters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan). This also happens with Israel, with which they lowered the level of diplomatic relations, describing it in the harshest terms and placing the condition that it apologize for its attack against the Turkish aid flotilla to Gaza, then asking for its help to shelter the victims of the recent earthquake. Those who are worried also warn that the experience of governing will not be an easy one for Arab Islamists, first because of their lack of experience, and second because the problems they will inherit from tyrannical regimes are immense – in particular the issue of minorities that face almost concealed religious and social discrimination, which will emerge openly with the arrival of Islamist movements unaccustomed to pluralism to power. And we have seen how the “Islamist climate” that has prevailed in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak's regime has led to repeated clashes with the Copts, who are trying to preserve the narrow margin that had been allowed them. Those who are of this opinion believe that Arab Islamists might gradually move away from their declared moderation, if they face difficulties in leading their governments or find themselves forced to provide successive concessions within the framework of their alliances. And from among those who voice fears from Islamist regimes, there are some who exaggerate a little, as did Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al-Rai, who saw in the possibility of the fall of the regime in Syria the collapse of the last buffer zone in the face of an “Ottoman crescent” stretching from Istanbul to Egypt through Lebanon, returning to memory a bitter experience that lasted for centuries.
