Are all the Egyptian revolutionary and political powers supposed to approve the document reached following the meeting held by Chief of Staff General Sami Anan two days ago with some partisan leaders? Certainly not. Differences are natural and the discrepancy affecting the visions is bound to generate diverging reactions. Moreover, the conflicting interests of this or that political faction will inevitably produce conflicting positions toward each article in the document. But what is important is for the polarization and the division on the Egyptian political scene not to obstruct the revolution's accomplishment of its goals, thus prompting the beginning of a new series that will deplete all the sides following the series of "the Constitution or the elections first." Indeed, such series will not be entertaining, will strip the revolution of its content, extend the transitional phase and increase the suffering of the people, at a time when the politicians are practicing the luxury of competing over power. So, let each side uphold its position, since the arena is open to all. As for the military council, it should firstly alleviate the tensions and promptly implement what was agreed on during the meetings, so that those who attended and signed are not let down. It should also prepare the climate for the first free parliamentary elections in Egypt since the July 1952 revolution, following the implementation of the remaining articles of the document which also feature the lifting of the emergency law, the discontinuation of the trying of civilians before military courts and the adoption of a law guaranteeing the distancing of the symbols of the disbanded National Party from political action. This is the minimum acceptable level, whether for those who rejected the outcome of the meeting or those who attended it and signed the document. However, if the council resorts to a play on words and "interpretations" by saying that the document talked about the "studying" of the lifting of the emergency law and not its actual lifting, it will consecrate the belief that the goal behind the meeting was to absorb the anger on the street and satisfy the parties at the expense of the revolution and the blood of the martyrs. Let the parties whose heads attended the meeting and signed the statement proceed down the path they chose, prepare themselves for the parliamentary elections while supported by any of the non-partisan revolutionary powers and let any partisan leader withdraw his signature as it was done by the head of the Justice Party, Mustafa al-Najjar, to please his party's members. As for the naysayers among the party members and the revolutionaries or those who expressed reservations over some articles in the document and believed they did not meet the aspirations, they are also entitled to uphold their position, promote it and use all the peaceful means they deem fit to express it – including the staging of million-man demonstrations on Tahrir Square. But what is important is for those who signed the document not to impose their positions on the rest, and for those who opposed the step not to accuse the sides which engaged in the political process of "treason," although some who attended the meeting and headed to the studios to appear on satellite channels diverged over the interpretation of the articles which they had signed. This for example was the case of the article related to the principles governing the constitution. It is natural for some who were not represented in the meeting or who abstained from attending it to oppose all that was featured in it. So, let each side present its ideas, viewpoints and visions to the people who launched and offered sacrifices for the revolution, without claiming that it is the people or that it represents all the people. For their part, if the people believe that what the heads of the parties signed was a "treason against the revolution" or that the document did not achieve their aspirations and demands, then they will boycott the elections, will not give them any attention and will respond to the calls made by the revolutionary powers that are opposed to the document to take to the squares, demonstrate or stage sit-ins. Consequently, the military council should - for once - beat everyone with decisions, measures or even laws going in line with the revolutionary state which Egypt is supposedly witnessing. It should relinquish its reservations over demands, whose accomplishment - it knows - will contribute to the alleviation of the tensions, recognizing the fact that the articles of the document were all known, announced and repeatedly demanded by political powers and that the council firstly rejected them before finally ratifying them. As for the powers which perceived the document as being opposed to the principles and goals of the revolution, they are now facing a new challenge after they lost some of their momentum on the political arena – one which was secured for them by the partisan leaders who signed the document even if only on the moral level. There is no dispute between two sides, but rather different visions adopted by each to achieve the goals of the revolution from its own viewpoint. But in the end, it is up to the people - the makers of the revolution - to have the final say.
