The demonstrations in Iran have crowned a phase of social and political transformations that date back to the beginning of the revolution, i.e. to the dispute over power and the seclusion of many symbols that surrounded Khomeini, such as Abu Hassan Bani-Sadr, Mahdi Bazerkan, and many clergymen. All these elements interacted during the past thirty years until the recent presidential elections and the accompanying controversy. The supporting and opposing popular movement seemed to be either a protest at or a support for the results, while in fact it is much deeper than that. It is a protest at the whole political class and its administration of the country during the past thirty years. Of course, Mir-Hossein Mousavi doesn't represent the expectations of the demonstrators, who didn't specify their demands in a program that defines the reasons for rebelling against the system. Mousavi became a symbol forcibly, if one might say. He is the son of the revolution. He didn't steer away from its course. He believes in the Wilayat Al Faqih. He is neither against the Revolutionary Guards nor the Basij or the Pasdaran. He isn't against the interest of the regime. He is not a reformist in the exact sense of the word. He isn't known to be a supporter of estrangement nor of reconciliation with the United States without a price. The man was Prime Minister when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was President of the Republic. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad tends more towards reform. Away from his revolutionary declarations and belligerent tendencies, away from his naïve popular ideas, the man reined in during his first presidential mandate and his elections campaign Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Council. He accused him and his family, as well as other clergymen, of corruption. He waged a strong campaign against him and his supporters of clergymen and the political class, which became rich after the revolution, thus burdening it and its course. On the other hand, Mousavi appeared to be an ally of the symbol that was the president and participated in building the institutions, the most influential of which he supervised. He is known for his corruption. He can't turn against himself nor support reform. Reformists knew him well under Mohammad Khatami. He was the staunchest opponent of his ideas and openness. There is no difference between the two men (Mousavi and Ahmadinejad), if we were to take reform as a measure. They both want to preserve the revolution's achievements and institutions under the cloak of the wali al-faqih, whereas reform can only take place through changing them or those who supervise them and take advantage of their positions. Transformations are still at their onset in Iran. They will find someone other than Mousavi to express them. However, they will de facto negatively affect Tehran's negotiation stance with the United States and push Washington to test more sanctions for supporting the opponents of the ruling class. They will also delay progress in the nuclear program. A thread of the revolution's rug has slithered. Reforming it needs skills that the Supreme Leader lack in the current situation despite his experience. Ahmadinejad and Mousavi too lack these skills. Importing them would turn the Persian rug into a rag that would need years of patching up. Some Iranians will prefer to weave others, but – and this is what everyone fears – they might be tainted with the color of blood.
