Any Lebanese cannot but praise Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's Secretary General, for his rejection of Israel's theft of Lebanon's petroleum resources. While the government of Benjamin Netanyahu only concluded that Nasrallah's speech, on the anniversary of the ‘July War Victory', meant ‘we dare you to start a war', a fierce debate continues to polarize the political and military elites in Israel, regarding ‘the third Lebanon war', thought to be inevitable. On the other hand, a fraction of the Lebanese remain in the very least pessimistic, the Secretary General's promises of victory in an upcoming war notwithstanding. Once again, a reminder of how deep divisions among the Lebanese are would be futile, and the same applies regarding their dispute over the characterization of the victory, or over any other issue, ad nauseam. Some do not see the fall of one thousand martyrs as a victory, for which the cost was the sanctity of Hezbollah's arms and the latter's retreat to political quarrels, no matter how much the Party of God abstains from power and its spoils. Such people still cannot see that victory except in terms of the lofty price paid by the Lebanese from their blood and properties, and in terms of Hezbollah's arms turning towards the home front and encumbering political life in a manner that invalidates any dialogue. Until the UNIFIL was deployed by land and sea, the claim of having achieved a victory did not have logic on its side, so long that the resistance is kept away from the border, and Israel is protected against rocket attacks. That, at least, is the view of the faction opposed to the policies of Hezbollah and its allies, who were all accused of exploiting the victory for political gains, ever since they toppled the government of Saad Hariri, along with the Doha agreement. It was a strange coincidence that a UNIFIL patrol came under attack a few hours before Hassan Nasrallah's speech. It was also bizarre that the speech ignored the incident instead of putting its implications in context. This is while some have questioned the nature of ‘the intended message' behind the attack, and the identity of the target of such a message. If the attack is to be also seen from the viewpoint of undermining resolution 1701, or at least hinting at the possibility of shirking 1701,- after Hezbollah also decided to dismiss resolution 1757, which established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, by invoking a ‘conspiracy against the resistance'-, the outcome would be more arguments in favor of those who fear that Lebanon may be soon classed as a rogue state. In truth, everyone must understand the significance of the American-European demands for Lebanon to honor its ‘commitments', which must not be influenced by any regional circumstances. There is concern in Washington and several European capitals that the regime in Syria may create a distraction or ‘deflate' the domestic uprising with a war in the Golan or South Lebanon, a concern that is also echoed amongst a large segment of the Lebanese people – including the March 14 coalition. Amid this, the ‘oil front' appears as the upcoming war that Hezbollah does not want… but, and no one knows yet, the question is will this war take place before the laws that Hassan Nasrallah urged the government of Najib Mikati to enact, to exploit the oil resources? Bear in mind here that the Israeli thefts have been taking place long before any Lebanese or Arab measure. There are two bottom lines to the Secretary General's speech: One, giving a boost to the morale of his party and his men, who include four individuals wanted by the STL for their suspected involvement in the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri - or the party's ‘sacred suspects', in the words of former President Amin Gemayel…Second, by extension, boosting morale by preparing for the ‘oil front': Since every front has its weapons of choice, the equation becomes, or should become, for the Lebanese, as follows: Wealth after poverty, with the prerequisite being the oil protected by Hezbollah's weapons. The Party of God is now on the front, while the other faction is still in the debacle of the STL ‘conspiracy'. Isn't this supposed to suggest something to the Lebanese? That the Future bloc tells the people that the same arms promised to protect the oil wealth ‘have lost their legitimacy after they were aimed at their chests, and after they abetted the suspects' in the assassination of Rafik Hariri? Just like the ‘hypothetical' equation once was the government in return for the STL, and then became ‘the STL in return for stability', it probably will not be very painful for many that the equation of ‘either wealth or justice' will be soon offered! The Lebanese have become addicted to gratuitous and hypothetical pain, it seems. Going back to square one, with the dialogue and the purpose and legitimacy of Hezbollah's arms, can one assume that Lebanon will be able to demand its rights to its oil resources, before the demarcation of the maritime border with Israel? The Secretary General's speech failed to mention that the government of Majib Mikati cannot negotiate only notionally, but instead has to negotiate with Israel, even if through the United Nations. This is because prior to such demarcation, there can be no grounds in international laws to put an end to the theft, irrespective of its magnitude and the ‘cunning' and the skill of the thief. If it doesn't negotiate with the enemy, will a dialogue between the Lebanese government and that of Ismail Haniyeh do it any good at all, in order to exploit a wealth estimated in the billions of dollars?
